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NOT JUST AN ACT OF MERCY: THE DEMISE OF
POST-CONVICTION RELIEF AND A
RIGHTFUL CLAIM TO CLEMENCY
KATHLEEN M. RmoLFI*
INTRODUCrION
During the twelve years of their marriage, Brenda Aris' husband
blackened her eyes many times, cracked her ribs, and broke her jaw. Rick
Axis threatened to kill Brenda and her parents if she ever called the police.
Brenda left repeatedly, only to be stalked, dragged home, and beaten
again. During the last year of his life, Rick beat Brenda on a daily basis.
During the six weeks before his death, Rick kept Brenda padlocked in their
bedroom. On the day of his death, he beat her throughout the day.' Just
before passing out from using drugs and alcohol, Rick threatened that "he
didn't think he was going to let [Brenda] live till morning."2 Brenda be-
lieved him. When she was certain he was asleep, she shot him 3 In her
conversations with police following the shooting, Brenda said, "If he's
dead, at least he won't kill me. It was self-defense."4
Brenda Aris was charged with second degree murder5 The California
trial court ruled that Brenda was not entitled to present a claim of self-
defense to the jury. Brenda was convicted and sentenced to fifteen years to
life imprisonment.' The appellate court upheld the trial court's ruling on
Brenda's self-defense claim, holding that, as a matter of law, self-defense
"requires an honest belief that the killer is in imminent danger of death or
* Associate Professor, Santa Clara University School of Law. Thanks to June Carbone
and Carol Sanger for their unyielding friendship and invaluable intellectual guidance
throughout the life of this project; to Andy Breiner for his indispensable contribution to the
later draft of this article; to Holly Maguigan for her willingness to interrupt her vacation to
read and comment on the final draft; to Denise Notzon, Christine Ogan, Jill Niedrauer,
Maureen Keller, and especially to Maureen Randal for their excellent research assistance;
and to Linda Starr whose love and insight continue to sustain me. This work is dedicated to
Zoe and Dasiell Ridolfi-Starr.
1. Petitioner's Brief at 11, In the Matter of Brenda Denise Aris, Petition for Commuta-
tion of Sentence and Release, Before the California Board of Prison Terms (April 16,1992)
[hereinafter Petition for Commutation].
2. People v. Aris, 264 Cal. Rptr. 167, 171 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).
3. Petition for Commutation, supra note 1, at 12.
4. Id. at 12-13 (citing Trial Th., Vol I at 129).
5. Aris, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 171. A sentence enhancement was attached because a firearm
was discharged in the commission of a felony. Id. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 189, 12022.5
(West 1995) (providing for sentence enhancement for crimes committed with a firearm).
6. Ari, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 171. The enhancement for use of a firearm was stayed. Id.
43
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great bodily injury,"7 and that, given this definition, no reasonable juror
would find it possible to be in imminent fear of a sleeping man.8
After having served nearly five years of her sentence, Brenda peti-
tioned California Governor Pete Wilson for clemency. 9 In her petition,
Brenda claimed that she had not received a fair trial because a defense
expert had not been allowed to testify that Brenda suffered from "battered
7. Id-
8. In the Aris case, the trial court instructed the jury on imperfect self-defense, but
refused to instruct on perfect self-defense. People v. Humphrey, 13 Cal. 4th 1073 (Sup, Ct
1996). In upholding the trial court's refusal to so instruct the jury, the appellate court
agreed that the reasonableness element required for perfect self-defense (along with the
honest belief) could not be established by Brenda Aris because "the defendant presented no
substantial evidence that a reasonable person under the same circumstances would have
perceived imminent danger and a need to kill in self-defense." Aris, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 1192.
Although expert testimony on Battered Woman's Syndrome was allowed to support the
subjective, honest belief element of Brenda Aris' imperfect self-defense claim, neither the
trial court nor the appellate court found such testimony relevant in establishing the objec-
tive, reasonableness element of a defendant's case. Humphrey, 13 Cal. 4th at 1085.
In a recent California Supreme Court decision, however, the court held that evidence
of Battered Woman's Syndrome is relevant to both elements of perfect self-defense: "the
reasonableness, as well as the subjective existence of defendant's belief in the need to de-
fend. .. ." Humphrey, 13 Cal. 4th at 1088-1089. The court "disapprove[d] of People v.
Axis ... to the extent that . .. [the decision is] inconsistent with this conclusion."
Humphrey, 13 Cal. 4th at 1089. The California Supreme Court found that expert testimony
might enable a jury to find seemingly unreasonable behavior to be reasonable when viewed
in the context of Battered Woman's Syndrome; for "as violence increases over time, and
threats gain credibility, a battered person might become sensitized and ... able reasonably
to discern when danger is real and when it is not." Humphrey, 13 Cal. 4th at 1086. Thus,
under Humphrey, it would be possible for a battered woman such as Brenda Aris to be in
imminent fear of a sleeping man.
While Humphrey allows expert testimony on Battered Woman's Syndrome to be used
in deciding the "reasonableness of [a defendant's] fear of death or serious injury," People v.
Erickson, 57 Cal. App. 4th 1391, 1400, 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d 740, 745, a California Appeals Court
has since determined that these experts cannot testify as to the actual state of mind of a
defendant. Id. Citing Aris, the Court in Erickson found that, although syndrome testimony
is admissible to "explain how a defendant's asserted subjective perception of a need to de-
fend herself 'would reasonably follow from the defendant's experience as a battered wo-
man,' an expert is not permitted to testify as to the expert's opinion that the defendant
actually perceived that she was in danger and needed to defend herself." Id.
9. Petition for Commutation, supra note 1, at 2. In every state, the executive clemency
power includes, either expressly or impliedly, the power to pardon and the power to grant
conditional pardons, commutations, reprieves, and remissions of fines and forfeitures. 1
UNITED STATES DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE ATroRNEY GENERAL'S SURVEY OF RELEASE PRO-
CEDURES 30-32 (1939) [hereinafter, SURVEY].
The term "pardon," although sometimes used interchangeably with "clemency," refers
to a distinct form of clemency. A pardon is the most complete form of clemency; it is a
purging of the offense. In re Ringnalda, 48 F.Supp. 975, 977 (D.D.C. 1943); see Ex parte
Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall) 333, 380 (1867) (stating that a pardon "reaches both the punish-
ment prescribed for the offense and the guilt of offender, and where pardon is full, it re-
leases the punishment, and blots out of existence the guilt, so that in the eye of the law, the
offender is as innocent as if he had never committed the offense").
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woman's syndrome."'" Rejecting Brenda's legal argument, Governor Wil-
.son stated:
[B]ecause clemency is not a continuation of the criminal justice
process, I will not reconsider petitioner's renewed legal claims
here. Mercy is not about a legal analysis of [battered woman's
syndrome]. I am not in a position to retry criminal cases or to
speculate as to what might have been if different evidence were
before the jury. Nor would it be appropriate for me to do so."
Governor Wilson was, however, sufficiently moved by Brenda's cir-
cumstances to commute her sentence of fifteen years to life imprisonment
to twelve years to life." He said, "I have considered and sympathized with
the pain and terror petitioner must have suffered during the many episodes
of violence she most certainly endured."' '
10. Petition for Commutation, supra note 1, at 13. "Battered woman's syndrome" was
a term used several years ago to describe the effects of abuse on women. More recent
research has led experts to prefer descriptive terms like "the effects of living with intimate
violence." See generally, Phyllis Goldfarb, Describing Without Circumscribing: Questioning
the Conviction of Gender in the Discourse of Intimate Violence, 64 GEo. WAsH. L REv. 582
(1996) (examining the construction of gender roles in the discourse of intimate violence).
In her clemency petition, Aris did not claim that she had been improperly denied an
instruction on self-defense. Perhaps her counsel did not deem it wise to request that Gover-
nor Wilson flatly disregard the trial court's holding that Axis was not entitled to present a
claim of self-defense to the jury. Rather, Aris attacked the appellate court ruling that the
trial court's limitation of expert testimony was harmless error. Aris argued that, based on
information gathered during post-trial juror interviews, the limitation of expert testimony
could not have been harmless error. Ars, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 180-81. The appellate court had
held that the trial court had in fact committed error in barring the expert's proffered testi-
mony that Aris was a battered woman whose experience influenced her perception of dan-
ger at the time that she shot and killed her husband. However, the appellate court deemed
that error harmless "because of the particular circumstances of this case." Id. at 181. This
conclusion was based primarily on the fact that Rick Aris was asleep at the time of the
shooting. Thus, the appellate court reasoned that it was "not reasonably probable that BWS
[battered woman's syndrome] testimony [would have convinced] the jury that, nevertheless,
the defendant honestly perceived an imminent danger resulting in a different verdict." Id.
11. Office of the Governor, State of California, Decision in the Matter of the Clemency
Request of Brenda Aris 4 (May 27,1993) (emphasis added) [hereinafter Clemency Request
Decision]. In reviewing clemency petitions from battered women convicted of murder, the
Governor will only ask, "Did the petitioner have the option to leave her abuser, or was the
homicide realistically her only chance to escape?" Governor Pete Wilson, Press Release
93-392 "Wilson Announces Battered Women's Syndrome Clemency Decisions," May 28,
1993, [hereinafter Press Release 93:392]. See Cookie Ridolli, Governor Improperly Re-
stricted Use of Pardoning Power, ST. B. BuLi., July 28, 1993, at 1 (asserting that Wilson's test
places improper restrictions on the exercise of clemency, and pointing out that the governor
cannot fairly answer his own test without consideration of the very issues he refuses to
consider); Minouche Kandel, Wilson Doesn't Get It - Governor Misses the Point About Bat-
tered Women, S.F. DAmY J., June 17, 1993, at 4 (criticizing the governor's questioning
whether the woman had the opportunity to leave her abuser since the question "assumes
that leaving stops the violence").
12. Clemency Request Decision, supra note 11, at 5.
13. Id.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Review of Law and Social Policy
1998]
HeinOnline  -- 24 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 45 1998
REVIEW OF LAW & SOCIAL CHANGE
While acknowledging that "the California Constitution gives the Gov-
ernor broad discretion to grant clemency on any condition he deems
proper,"'4 Wilson has flatly refused to revisit legal claims in any case, re-
serving his grants of clemency for "rare and extraordinary cases"' 5 or
innocence.
16
Governor Wilson's narrow interpretation of the executive clemency
power is wrong. His position reflects two erroneous assumptions: first, that
redressing a legal error in an individual case is strictly the province of the
judiciary; and second, that courts are always willing and able to correct an
injustice. This article argues that the United States Constitution and the
California Constitution authorize the executive to intervene in a criminal
case if intervention is necessary to achieve a just result - regardless of the
source of that injustice. Further, this article argues that clemency review,
guided by principles of justice as well as mercy, must be exercised more
frequently when access to post-conviction relief is restricted by courts and
legislatures.
Indeed, a careful analysis of the history, intended purpose, and nature
of the pardoning power reveals that, even in cases where judicial doors
remain open, the pardoning power may be exercised as the executive
deems fit, regardless of existing legal standards. Governor Wilson's refusal
to review claims of legal error leaves many who assert compelling claims
with neither judicial nor executive relief. While this denial of justice may
prove very costly for any defendant, it has special relevance for battered
women, who are often denied fair treatment in the judicial process.
It is not disputed that the executive pardoning power provides Gover-
nor Wilson with broad discretion. It is the thesis of this article that restrict-
ing application of executive clemency to cases of innocence or to cases with
mitigating factors that the executive finds personally compelling -or polit-
ically safeCamounts to an abuse of discretion. By categorically refusing to
exercise clemency review for cases involving legal error, the executive is
improperly redefining the pardoning power and rejecting his constitutional
mandate.
14. Press Release 93:392, supra note 11, at 5.
15. Id. Referring to Brenda Aris' case as well as to the cases of other battered women
whose clemency petitions had been submitted to him, Governor Wilson said, "No one could
listen to the litany of pain and abuse chronicled by these victims, knowing the appalling
statistics which reveal the scope of this tragedy, and not be deeply moved.... I am commit-
ted to their cause." Clemency Request Decision, supra note 12, at 1-2. Governor Wilson
then denied all but two women's petitions. One was Aris and the other was 78-year-old
Frances Mary Caccavale, whose petition was granted solely because of her age and failing
health. Richard Barbieri, Battered Woman Makes Legal History a Second Time, THE RE.
CORDER, June 1, 1993, at 4.
16. Letter from Janice Rogers Brown, Governor Wilson's legal affairs secretary, to
Convicted Women Against Abuse at Frontiera Prison (February 17, 1992).
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The 1993 United States Supreme Court decision in Herrera v. Collins17
has thrown these issues into sharp relief, confirming that the pardoning
power has not outlived its usefulness. In Herrera, Justice Rehnquist, writ-
ing for the majority, denied habeas relief to death row inmate Leonel Her-
rera'8 in part because he was not "left -without a forum;" he still could "file
a request for executive clemency." 19 The Court emphasized that habeas
corpus is not designed to guarantee error-free trials, and the real "'fail-
safe' of the criminal justice system" is the executive pardon20
This article articulates a theory of comprehensive and flexible clem-
ency review supported by the Herrera Court's confirmation of this essential
constitutional power: The executive has wide discretion to perform acts of
mercy, and also has a constitutional obligation to use clemency as an instru-
ment of justice. Part I presents the historical, judicial, and legislative devel-
opment of the federal pardoning power and of California's pardoning
power. Part II reviews the current state of habeas corpus law and, given
the severe restrictions on habeas review, calls for an increase in the exer-
cise of clemency review. Part I argues that the pardoning power, prop-
erly interpreted, (1) authorizes the executive to grant pardons for reasons
of mercy that are justice-based; (2) authorizes the executive to consider
claims of legal error that cannot be reached by the judiciary; and, (3) en-
ables the executive to revisit an established legal standard if the standard's
application is inconsistent with principles of justice.
I.
THE PARDON AS AN INSTRUMENT OF JUSTICE
The proposition that the executive has a constitutional duty to exercise
the pardon as an instrument of justice stands in sharp contrast to the popu-
lar understanding of the pardon as an executive gift that may be granted or
withheld in any case, for any reason. This "gift-giving theory of the pardon
has descended, conceptual baggage intact, from the God-like powers of an
absolute monarch.""1 Although the notion of the executive as an absolute
monarch is inconsistent with American social theories, the notion of a par-
don as an executive gift has persisted, giving rise to misconceptions regard-
ing the intended purpose of the pardoning power in the United States.
17. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993).
18. For a more detailed description of Herrera, see infra notes 147-64 and accompany-
ing text.
19. Herrera at 415.
20. Id.
21. KAnmEEN D.AN MOORE, PARDONS: JUSTICE, MiERCY AND THE Punuac F_xEmu-
ENCE 11 (1989). Moore conducts a ground-breaking philosophical analysis of pardons, ex-
amining the role of the pardoning power during the reign of Hammurabi in the eighteenth
century B.C. through modem times, to support her argument that there is no ethical basis
for treating a pardon as an executive gift. Moore concludes that a pardon is a "duty of
justice that follows from the principle that punishment should not exceed what is deserved."
Id. at 12 (emphasis added).
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This section shows that the framers of both the United States Constitution
and the California Constitution intended that the executive use the pardon-
ing power to redress injustices resulting from the improper, as well as the
proper, application of the criminal law.
The thirteenth-century English case of Katherine Passeavant illus-
trates dramatically the unique and critical role of the pardon in an imper-
fect system of criminal justice. The defendant, just four years old at the
time of her "crime," opened a door, accidently pushing a younger child into
a vessel of hot water. The child later died. Katherine was arrested and
imprisoned in the St. Albans jail, charged with criminal homicide. In 1249,
English law did not provide for an infancy defense, and exceptions were
not made for acts committed without criminal intent.'2 Guilty of murder
under the law, four-year-old Katherine was sentenced to death. Kathe-
rine's father, anguished by his daughter's imprisonment and impending ex-
ecution, but without recourse under the law, sought the only relief
possible-a pardon. 3 Katherine's father begged the King for a pardon,
which was granted.24
The value of the pardoning power in an arcane system of justice that
does not provide exceptions for the acts of small children is undeniable.
However, as criminal laws have become more sophisticated and flexible,
and procedures more elaborate, the role of the pardon has become deval-
ued by those who perceive our modem criminal justice system as quite
capable of dispensing justice in any given case.' Furthermore, while the
exercise of the pardoning power was once a sign of enormous political
strength,26 the granting of clemency is now likely to be perceived as very
costly to the executive. The California political arena is no exception. For-
mer California Governor Edmund (Pat) Brown admitted that political
22. NAOMI D. HURNARD, THE KING'S PARDON FOR HOMICIDE: BEFORE A.D. 1307, at
viii (1969).
23. Id. In England, from medieval times through the mid-nineteenth century, pardons
were frequently granted as legal solutions to problems arising from the law's failure to rec-
ognize self-defense, lack of intent, insanity, and age as factors relevant to a determination of
guilt. SURVEY, supra note 9, at 39-40.
As late as 1748, William York, a 10-year-old who killed a 5- year-old and buried the
child in a dunghill, was convicted, sentenced to death, and subsequently pardoned because
of his tender years. SURVEY, supra note 9, at 41.
24. HURN1ARD supra note 22.
25. Moreover, lawyers and legal scholars have paid little attention to the pardon, per-
haps because an act of pardon is virtually unreviewable by the courts. See MOORE, supra
note 21, at 6-7 (stating that "[p]ardons were an important topic for most of the great En-
lightenment philosophers. But until very recently, pardons have proceeded in relative phil-
osophical obscurity in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.").
26. MOORE, supra note 21, at 16-17. The ancient Romans were accustomed to pardons
(and to public executions), which occurred on coronation days and local holidays. "The
Romans evidently understood that the power to pardon is every bit as great a power as the
power to punish, and they used the pardon often and skillfully for their political ends." Id.
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pressure directly affected his clemency decisions.27 Governor Wilson, too,
was likely influenced by the ongoing media frenzy and public outcry in
making his decision to deny commutation to death row prisoner Robert
Alton Harris.8 In denying clemency to the twenty-eight battered women
convicted of crimes in California who have petitioned him, Governor WVil-
son likely understood that these cases pose significant political liability, de-
spite instances of sympathetic media coverage.29
Proper interpretation of the history and purpose of the pardoning
power, however, reveals that the power should persist, changing alongside
developments in the law.3 The exercise of the pardoning power should not
be understood as an interference with justice, but rather as a signal that the
public good has been served. A historical analysis of the pardoning power
suggests that the devaluation of the pardoning power is mistaken, and the
discomfort surrounding its exercise is misplaced.
A. The Federal Pardoning Power
1. The Constitutional Debate, 1787
The English pardoning power was a royal prerogative, viewed as the
King's individual act of "forgiveness" for a crime against the Crown. The
27. EDMUND G. BRowN, PUBUC JUSTICE, PRIVATE MERCY: A GovERNoR's EDUCA-
TION ON DEATH Row (1989). "Governors are so afraid of signing their own political death
warrant that clemency is just not exercised at anywhere near the rate it was 20 years ago.
The only governors commuting death sentences are lame duck governors who are on their
way out." Amy Chance, Brown Targeted Over Opposition to Death Penalty, SACRAMNt1ro
BEE, March 6, 1994, at A21 (quoting Gerald Uelmen, former dean of Santa Clara Univer-
sity Law School).
28. Robert Alton Harris was convicted in the deaths of two San Diego teenagers mur-
dered in 1978. His case received national attention throughout 11 years of judicial appeals
and petitions to Governor Wilson for clemency. Over 1,000 stories have been written about
the case in major newspapers alone. Search of LEXIS, News Library, Major Papers File
(June 3,1996). Harris asked that his sentence be commuted from a sentence of death to life
without the possibility of parole. The Governor denied clemency, and Harris %vas executed
on April 21,1992. Murderer Dies in California Gas Chamber, CHI.TRIB., Apr. 21, 1992, at 1.
29. Of the 34 petitions filed by the California Coalition for Battered Women in Prison
[hereinafter CCBWP], nine have been denied by Governer Wilson and 23 remain undecided
five years after filing. One petitioner has since been paroled and one has died. Nineteen
other women petitioned Governor Wilson without assistance from CCBWVP.
In 1990, at the close of his second term in office, former Ohio Governor, Richard
Celeste, granted clemency to 68 people, 25 of whom were battered women convicted of
killing or assaulting abusive partners. These acts generated a great deal of controversy and
criticism regarding the exercise of executive clemency. One newspaper editorial criticized
Celeste's "sad and sorry performance, an exercise of arrogance, if not outright contempt."
See Daniel T. Kobil, Do tie Paperwork or Die. Clemency, Ohio Style?, 52 OHIO ST. .J. 655,
656-57 (1991) (quoting Killers Spared, CoLumBus DiSPATCH, Jan. 14, 1991, at AS).
30. Indeed, the centuries-old power of executive clemency has endured because of its
very flexibility. The pardon represents the oldest type of release procedure, with records of
its use dating back to the Code of Hammurabi in the eighteenth century B.C. MOORE,
supra note 21, at 9. The power to pardon exists in every country of the world except China.
Daniel T. Kobil, The Quality of Mercy Strained. Wrestling the Pardoning Power from the
King, 69 TEx. L. REv. 569, 575 (1991) [hereinafter, Kobil, Quality of Mercy].
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King delegated his pardoning power to a royal governor in the American
colonies, who exercised the power in furtherance of royal interests, and
often at the expense of the colonists' concerns. 31 By the time of the Ameri-
can Revolution, colonists had become suspicious of the executive, and
some doubted the propriety of placing the power in the hands of governors
unfettered. 2 In the new republic, a crime was not viewed as an offense
against the king, but as an offense against the people. Thus, there was con-
cern that vesting the power to pardon in the executive would violate the
notion of a government "of the people, by the people, for the people. 33
Nonetheless, the Framers, themselves steeped in the tradition of Eng-
lish law, were in substantial agreement about the need for an executive
pardoning power and favored its adoption. 4 An executive pardon would
provide a safety-net in situations where application of the criminal law
would fail to reach a just result. Additionally, an executive pardon would
allow the President to heal the country in times of civil unrest, thereby
protecting national security.3 5
The early lawmakers understood that situations would undoubtedly
arise that were more complex than a general set of rules could anticipate
and handle justly. Alexander Hamilton argued in the Federalist Papers that
good social policy and humanitarian concerns required the creation of an
extraordinary remedy to deal fairly with exceptional cases:
The criminal code of every country partakes so much of nec-
essary severity, that without an easy access to exceptions in favour
of unfortunate guilt, justice would wear a countenance too sangui-
nary and cruel.36
Hamilton's defense of the power to pardon makes it clear that he
viewed the pardoning power as more than a means by which mistakes
made by judges or juries could be rectified. Indeed, Hamilton understood
the pardoning power as a necessary tool for redressing injustices resulting
from the proper application of the law.
James Iredell, a participant in the North Carolina Ratifying Conven-
tion in July 1788, echoed Hamilton's call for flexibility in curing the law's
inherent inadequacies. He argued:
31. SURVEY, supra note 9, at 88-89.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. See, e.g., Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256, 260 (1974) (stating that the Framers were
well acquainted with the history of clemency); Hoffa v. Saxbe, 378 F. Supp. 1221, 1231 (D.C.
Cir. 1974) (stating that the Framers were very familiar with the English precedent for the
pardoning power). See also Kobil, Quality of Mercy, supra note 30, at 589-92 (detailing the
Framers' discussion of pardoning power at the Constitutional Convention).
35. See generally M. FARRAND, 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVEN rION OF 1787
(1911); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 74 (Alexander Hamilton) (explaining the importance
of the power to pardon).
36. THE FEDERALiST No. 74 (Alexander Hamilton).
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It is the genius of the republican government that the laws
should be rigidly executed, without the influence of favor or ill-
will.... This strict and scrupulous observance of justice is proper
in all governments.... But, though this general principle be un-
questionable, surely there is no gentleman in the committee who
is not aware that there ought to be exceptions to it; because there
may be many instances where, though a man offends against the
letter of the law, yet peculiar circumstances in his case may entitle
him to mercy. It is impossible for any general law to foresee and
provide for all possible cases that may arise; and therefore an in-
flexible adherence to it, in every instance, might frequently be the
cause of great injustice.3 7
Thus, while Hamilton and IredeU believed that laws should be strictly
applied, they deemed the exercise of the executive pardon as complemen-
tary to the rigid application of the law.
Proposals for an executive pardoning power, however, were met with
objections concerning the inherent risk of abuse of discretion. Ultimately,
the Framers resolved the tension by vesting the pardoning power in the
President alone but prohibiting the exercise of the power in cases of im-
peachment by Congress. The Constitutional power to pardon is found in
Article II: "The President.. .shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Par-
dons for Offenses against the United States, except in Cases of
Impeachment."38
The Founders concluded that the power to pardon was integral to their
vision of the republic, and trusted the President to hold the power because
"where could it be more properly vested, than in a man who had received
such strong proofs of his possessing the highest confidence of the
people?"3 9
The Framers recognized that any effort to define the limits of the par-
doning power would destroy its effectiveness, for its exercise was intended
to complement the operation of an evolving criminal justice system. In-
deed, institutional competence varies with the adequacy of the vritten law
and with the availability of relief through existing criminal procedures. As
the ability of the system to dispense justice expands and contracts with
changes in the law, so, too, does the need to exercise the executive pardon.
For these reasons, the executive is entrusted and obligated to exercise the
pardoning power to the extent that just results are not attainable within the
criminal justice system.
37. James Iredell, Address at the North Carolina Ratifying Convention (July 28, 1788)
in 4 FouNDERs CoNsTrrTUrioN 17-18 (P.Kurland & PR Lerner eds. 1987) [hereinafter IredeU
Address].
38. U.S. CONST. art II, § 2, cl. 1.
39. Iredell Address, supra note 37, at 17-18.
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2. United States Supreme Court Jurisprudence
Though the executive power to pardon is affirmatively granted by the
Constitution, the Supreme Court did not squarely address the substantive
role of executive clemency until well into the twentieth century. Once it
did, the Court articulated a clemency jurisprudence consistent with the
Framers' intentions. Modem cases clearly establish that: (1) the pardoning
power is part of the overall Constitutional scheme; (2) the executive has
broad discretion to act for the public good so long as the act does not
otherwise offend the Constitution; (3) the power to pardon does not pose a
separation of powers problem, as the three branches were never intended
to be completely separate and independent; (4) the role of the pardoning
power is dependent on the institutional competence of the judiciary and
the legislature; and, (5) exercise of the pardoning power is reserved for
exceptional cases.
The Supreme Court's meandering path to these principles began with
United States v. Wilson,n° the first case to arise under the pardoning power.
Wilson addressed the relatively narrow question of whether the court
should take judicial notice of a pardon that the parties had not pled. In
Wilson, the defendant, George Wilson, had been charged in eight separate
indictments with robbing the United States mails, and had entered a plea of
not guilty to all charges.4 1 Following a trial on one of the cases, Wilson was
convicted and sentenced to death. On the day he was sentenced, he with-
drew his earlier pleas in each of the remaining cases and entered guilty
pleas. Three weeks later, President Andrew Jackson pardoned Wilson on
his first case, thus relieving him of the death sentence, but expressly stipu-
lated that the pardon not extend to any of the other cases.42
At the time of his sentencing on the remaining charges, the court ex-
pressed concern that the pardon might apply to one of the cases for which
he was about to be sentenced.43 Wilson however, made no attempt to avail
himself of the pardon, failing to argue that it was a bar to sentencing on the
case before the court.' This presented the trial court with a dilemma. Be-
cause the court was aware of the presidential pardon but was unsure of the
pardon's effect on Wilson's second related case, the court certified two
questions to the United States Supreme Court: 1) Did the pardon bar fur-
ther prosecution of any of Wilson's pending cases?; and 2) Even if the par-
don did bar prosecution, could Wilson "derive any advantage from the
pardon without bringing the same judicially before the court?"45 Because
40. United States v. Wilson, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 150 (1833).
41. Id. at 151.
42. Id. at 153.
43. Id. at 154.
44. Id. at 150, 158-59. References to George Wilson's case do not explain why Wilson
refused to avail himself of the pardon.
45. Id. at 158.
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the Supreme Court found the record insufficient, it addressed only the sec-
ond question.4
Justice Marshall, writing for the Court, ruled that Wilson could not
benefit from a pardon without pleading it as a bar to the prosecution or
presenting it to the court.47 Marshall defined the pardoning power, as "a
private, though official act" delivered to the pardonee, not to the court.48
Marshall remarked that a judge, "sees only with judicial eyes, and knows
nothing respecting any particular case, of which he is not informed judi-
cially."4 9 Thus, a pardon not communicated was not before the court and
could not be acted upon.50 Marshall then explained:
A pardon is a deed, to the validity of which delivery is essen-
tial, and delivery is not complete without acceptance. It may then
be rejected by the person to whom it is tendered; and if it be re-
jected, we have discovered no power in a court to force it on
him.'
This dicta has been understood to suggest that a pardon denotes a pri-
vate contractual relationship between the executive and the subject of the
pardon, effective only if accepted by the pardonee. I
Although Wilson held only that a prisoner must plead a pardon in or-
der for it to receive consideration from a court, Marshall's dicta concerning
the private contractual nature of the pardon long wreaked havoc with the
Court's efforts to articulate a coherent clemency jurisprudence. The opin-
ions in Ex Parte Wells 3 and Burdick v. United Statess4 illustrate Wilson's
pernicious influence.
In Wells, the Court was asked to decide whether the pardoning power
includes the power to grant conditional pardons. Because the prisoner in
Wells had already accepted the pardon, conditions and all,55 the Court sim-
ply could have applied Marshall's private contract approach to conclude
46. Justice Marshall concluded that, without an adequate record, it was impossible to
determine whether the two indictments were for the same crime or even whether the de-
fendant was the same man. Id. at 159. Marshall explained that President Jackson's pardon
would excuse Wilson if the Court were sentencing him for the same crime for which he had
been pardoned. In this case, however, he concluded that "it would be unnecessary to dis-
cuss or decide it." Id. at 160.
47. Id. at 163.
48. Id- at 160-61.
49. Id. at 161.
50. Id.
51. Id
52. See, e.g., Burdick v. United States, 236 U.S. 79 (1914) (holding that a pardon must
be accepted by the pardonee in order to be effective). See also G. Sydney Buchanan, The
Nature of a Pardon Under the United States Constitution, 39 Ojuo ST. LJ. 36, 38 (1978)
(discussing cases requiring a pardonee's acceptance for a valid pardon).
53. Ex parte Wells, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 307 (1855).
54. Burdick v. United States 236 U.S. 79 (1914).
55. Wells, 59 U.S. at 307-08.
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that the prisoner was bound by his agreement. Indeed, the Wells court ob-
served that:
[T]he power to offer a condition, without ability to enforce its
acceptance, when accepted by the convict, is the substitution, by
himself, of a lesser punishment than the law has imposed upon
him, and he cannot complain if the law executes the choice he has
made.56
Interestingly, however, the Wells opinion did not end with a reitera-
tion of Marshall's dicta in Wilson. Instead, the opinion emphasized that
precedent for decisions concerning the pardoning power must come from
the laws of England as they existed at the time of the adoption of the
United States Constitution. Since the power to pardon in England in-
cluded the power to impose conditions, the power to pardon in the United
States included the same.57 The Court observed further that:
The King cannot, by any previous license, make an offence
[sic] dispunishable which is malum in se, i.e. unlawful in itself, as
being against the law of nature, or so far against the public good
as to be indictable at common law. A grant of this kind would be
against reason and the common good, and therefore void.58
The Court underscored this point with reference to the King's obliga-
tion to act for the benefit of all of his subjects -an obligation incurred
upon his taking of an oath at his coronation, which includes a promise "that
he will cause justice to be exercised with mercy."5 9
By both recognizing the importance of the pardoning power as a tool
for advancing the public interest, and acknowledging the pardonee's pre-
rogative to reject an executive order of pardon, the Wells Court sanctioned
two competing ideas. The executive could appropriately grant a pardon for
the public good, but the pardonee could lawfully thwart that purpose by
refusing to accept. The Court would not resolve this tension for another
three-quarters of a century. In the interim, the Court continued to apply
the acceptance requirement first articulated in Wilson.
In Burdick, the Court expressly held that a pardon must be accepted in
order to be effective. 60 A federal grand jury investigating a federal em-
ployee suspected of leaking classified information to the press called the
defendant, George Burdick, editor of the New York Tribune, to testify.
Despite the fact that Burdick asserted the Fifth Amendment and refused to
answer any questions put to him, he was ordered to return and testify the
56. Id. at 315.
57. Id. at 311.
58. Id. at 312.
59. Id. at 311.
60. Burdick, 236 U.S. at 90-91.
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next day.61 On the second day, he was handed a pardon signed by Presi-
dent Woodrow Wilson, granting him a "full and unconditional pardon for
all offenses against the United States which he... had committed or may
have committed. '62 Despite that pardon, Burdick again refused to testify,
stating that his answers might tend to incriminate him.63
The prosecutor argued that Burdick no longer had any Fifth Amend-
ment basis for refusing to testify because, cloaked with the protection of
the President's pardon, he no longer was subject to sanction for any self-
incrimination.6t The lower court accepted the government's argument,
cited Burdick for contempt, fined him $500, and ordered him to testify or
be jailed until he complied. The court concluded that Burdick's acceptance
of the pardon was not required for it to be effective.6'
Reversing the lower court, the Supreme Court reiterated the rule that
a presidential pardon requires acceptance in order to be effective. Citing
Wilson for both its reasoning and authority, the Court stated that an indi-
vidual has a right "against the exercise of executive power not solicited by
him nor accepted by him.'' 66 Thus, the Burdick Court expressly adopted
the Wilson Court's conception of the pardon as a private contract. 67
61. Id. at 85.
62. Id. at 86.
63. Id
64. Id. at 87.
65. Id. at 86-87.
66. Id. at 91.
67. The Court distinguished its decision in Burdick from its apparently inconsistent
decision in Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896). In Brown, the petitioner was subpoenaed
by the Interstate Commerce Commission to appear before a federal grand jury investigating
the rate practices of the Allegheny Valley Railway Company. A federal statute granted himimmunity from prosecution for his testimony. Like Burdick, Brown refused to testify, citing
protection under his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. Brown was held in
contempt, ordered to pay a fine, and jailed for contempt. On review, the Supreme Court
ruled that Brown was required to testify, and held that a grant of legislative immunity could
not be rejected by the person to whom it was tendered. Id. at 610.
In ruling that a grant of executive pardon requires acceptance in order to be effective,
the Burdick Court distinguished a grant of legislative immunity, or a legislative pardon,
from an executive pardon. The Burdick Court reasoned that it would be unfair to force an
executive pardon upon an individual, for an executive pardon intimates guilt. Legislative
immunity, however, is noncommittal, reasoned the Burdick Court. Burdick, 236 U.S. at 94.
G. Sidney Buchanan has criticized the Burdick Court's reasoning as circular.
The Court states that a pardon, unlike a grant of legislative immunity, "carries an
imputation of guilt," and this is advanced as the reason for allowing the pardonee
to refuse the immunity tendered by the pardon. A pardon, however, carries an
imputation of guilt only if the validity of the pardon depends upon its acceptance
by the pardonee. If the requirement of acceptance is removed, the imputation of
guilt vanishes. It becomes circular, therefore, to use the imputation of guilt argu-
ment as a justification for the requirement of acceptance.
G. Sidney Buchanan, The Nature of a Pardon Under the United States Constitution, 39 OHno
ST. L. J. 36, 44 (1978).
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Ten years later, in Ex parte Grossman,68 the Court took the first signif-
icant step away from Wilson. Unlike the earlier cases, that had turned
largely on procedural considerations, Grossman addressed the role of the
pardoning power in the overall constitutional scheme. The case was unu-
sual in that it involved a pardon for criminal contempt. Grossman had
been charged with maintaining a nuisance by selling liquor in violation of
the National Prohibition Act. He was arrested, tried, found guilty of crimi-
nal contempt, sentenced to one year in prison, and fined $1,000 for viola-
tion of a temporary restraining order. Following Grossman's sentencing,
the President pardoned him, commuting his jail sentence on the condition
that he pay the fine. Grossman accepted the pardon, paid the fine, and was
released. Notwithstanding the pardon, the district court committed Gross-
man to the Chicago House of Correction to serve the sentence. Grossman
petitioned the United States Supreme Court for a writ of habeas corpus. 69
The question presented to the Court was whether the power to pardon
extends to cases of contempt of court. The government argued that the
pardon was ineffective because the President's power to pardon extends
only to offenses against the United States.7 ° Moreover, the government
argued, extending the pardoning power to include contempt of court would
violate separation of powers principles and detract from the independence
of the judicial branch.71
Rejecting the government's first argument, the Supreme Court held
that the pardoning power may be exercised not only in cases involving in-
dictable crimes but also in cases involving criminal contempt of court. The
Court recognized that, historically, there has been a recognition of the
practical need to distinguish between a pardon for criminal contempt and a
pardon for civil contempt.72 Civil contempt is remedial and intended to
benefit a private complainant, while criminal contempt is punitive; it ad-
vances the public interest by vindicating the authority of the court and by
deterring other derelictions.73 Noting that pardons have always been in-
tended to allow the executive to address concerns about the public good,
the Court concluded that pardoning criminal contempt was within the
scope of the executive's pardoning power.74
The Court further recognized that the pardoning power is an integral
part of the constitutional scheme. While legislative powers are vested in
Congress, executive power in the President, and judicial power in the
courts, nowhere does the Constitution expressly state that the three
68. Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87 (1925).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 108. It was argued that the use of the word "offences" [sic] in Article 2 of the
Constitution included only crimes and misdemeanors triable by jury. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 111.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 109-12.
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branches of government should be kept independent and separate.75 To
the contrary, various provisions of the constitution indicate that complete
independence and separation is neither attained nor intended.7 6 The Court
rejected the government's second argument and concluded that exercise of
the pardoning power for contempt was not a violation of separation of
powers. Rather, this exercise of the executive pardoning power was an in-
tended and acceptable check on the other branches of government, en-
abling the executive to act when necessary for the public interest.
Grossman's petition was granted, and Grossman was released.
In Grossman, the Court withdrew from its earlier notion of the pardon
as the executive's personal act of mercy and focused its attention on the
role of the pardoning power within the Constitutional scheme:
Executive clemency exists to afford relief from undue harsh-
ness or evident mistake in the operation or enforcement of the
criminal law. The administration of justice by the courts is not
necessarily always wise or certainly considerate of circumstances
which may properly mitigate guilt. To afford a remedy, it has al-
ways been thought essential... to vest some other authority than
the court's power to ameliorate or avoid particular criminal
judgments.7
The Court emphasized the importance of discretion in the exercise of
the power, stating that "whoever is to make it useful must have full discre-
tion to exercise it."' T8 Such broad discretion is consistent with the Framers'
understanding that the pardoning power should neither be fixed nor re-
duced to a remedial formula capable of mechanical application. Rather,
the pardoning power was intended to remain fluid, adaptable to the ever-
changing capacities of courts and legislatures to ensure the dispensation of
justice.79
75. Id at 119.
76. !dM at 119-20. For example, through the veto power, the executive and one more
than one-third of either House can defeat legislation; one-half of the House and two-thirds
of the Senate may impeach and remove members of the judiciary; the President can re-
prieve or pardon all offenses after their commission, either before, during, or after trial
without modification or regulation by Congress; one House of Congress can withhold all
appropriations and stop government operations; and, the Senate can hold up presidential
appointments which constitutionally require confirmation, thereby depriving the President
of the agents necessary to ensure that laws are enforced. These restraints indicate that the
independence of each branch is qualified. Id. at 120.
77. Id. at 120-122.
78. Id. at 121.
79. The Grossman Court emphasized that the Constitution is a living document, inter-
pretation of which must necessarily evolve with time: "[T]he provisions of the Constitution
are not mathematical formulas having their essence in their form.... Their significance is
vital not formal; it is to be gathered not simply by taking the words and a dictionary, but by
considering their origin and the line of their growth". Id. at 116 (citation omitted).
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In 1927, in Biddle v. Perovich,8 ° the Supreme Court formally aban-
doned the "private act of. grace" definition of the pardoning power. The
defendant, Vuco Perovich, had been convicted of first degree murder and
was sentenced to be hanged. After the execution had been delayed several
times, President Taft commuted Perovich's sentence to life imprisonment.8 '
Perovich filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in federal district court
alleging that his incarceration was illegal. Perovich argued that because his
removal from jail to the penitentiary was not authorized by the sentencing
statute, his consent was required for the President's commutation to be
valid.82 The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the President
had the authority to commute Perovich's sentence from death to life im-
prisonment without regard for the existing sentencing statute.
The Supreme Court upheld the commutation and, for the first time,
decisively departed from the acceptance requirement that courts had previ-
ously imposed upon the exercise of the pardoning power.83 Focusing on
the place of the pardoning power in the overall Constitutional scheme, the
Court stated, "[A] pardon... is not a private act of grace from an individ-
ual happening to possess power. It is part of the Constitutional scheme and
when granted it is the determination of the ultimate authority that the pub-
lic welfare will be better served by inflicting less than what the judgment
was fixed."84
The Court recognized that the power of the President to act for the
public good supersedes the wishes of the individual granted the pardonY
Analogizing the exercise of the pardoning power to the imposition of a
sentence, the Perovich Court stated, "Just as the original punishment would
be imposed without regard to the prisoner's consent and in the teeth of his
will, whether he liked it or not, [in the exercise of the pardoning power,]
the public welfare, not his consent, determines what shall be done. '8 6
80. Biddle v. Perovich, 274 U.S. 480 (1927).
81. Id. at 485.
82. Id. Perovich asserted that although President Taft had technically executed a com-
mutation, his act was not a commutation, but rather a pardon because it did not conform to
the definition of a commutation. He argued that a commutation is a lessening of the same
kind of punishment, not a substitution of one kind of punishment for another. Thus, Per-
ovich argued that, unlike a commutation, which does not require delivery and acceptance,
President Taft's order was in fact a pardon invalid without acceptance. Id.
The government contended that a "commutation," the easing of a punishment, does
not refer only to a reduction in degree of the same kind of punishment, but also denotes the
substitution of a milder punishment for a harsher one. Since a life sentence is a lesser pun-
ishment than death, the government argued that the President's action was a commutation
requiring neither acceptance nor delivery. Id. at 485-87.
The Court concluded that there was in fact no distinction between the power to pardon
and the power to commute a sentence, although they had previously been viewed as distinct
and separate forms of clemency. Id. at 487.
83. Id. at 487.
84. Id. at 486.
85. Id. at 486-87.
86. Id. at 486.
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Thus, the Supreme Court, without expressly overruling Burdick s ' al-
tered the theory of the pardoning power. The pardon was a private act of
grace no longer, but an act for the public welfare.88
In Schick v. Reed, 9 the Supreme Court resolved that both public pol-
icy and humanitarian concerns outweigh an individual's claim of right to a
pardon unencumbered by conditions. In 1954, Maurice Schick, a master
sergeant in the army, was found guilty of killing an eight-year-old girl and
was sentenced to death. In 1960, President Eisenhower commuted his sen-
tence to life imprisonment on condition that he never become parole eligi-
ble.90 In 1971, Schick filed suit alleging that the United States Board of
Parole was obliged to consider him for parole, despite the conditional com-
mutation. Schick argued that the condition attached to his pardon unfairly
placed him in a position different from that of other prisoners who had
been sentenced to life imprisonment. Had Schick received a life sentence
at the time of his conviction, he, like others who received life sentences
under the statute existing at that time, would have become eligible for pa-
role. The District Court and the Court of Appeals unanimously rejected
Schick's argument, reasoning that the President has the power to commute
a sentence upon conditions that do not otherwise offend the Constitution.91
87. 1d. at 487-88 ("We are of opinion that the reasoning of Burdick... is not to ne
extended to the present case."). It is unclear whether the Court intended to limit or overrule
Burdick. Some scholars believe Perovidi to be a "total repudiation of the Marshall concep-
tion of a pardon as a private act of grace." Buchanan, supra note 67, at 47. But see Kobil,
Quality of Mercy, supra note 30, at 595 (taking the view that Perovich merely limits the
earlier holding that a presidential pardon could be refused).
Although the latter view would appear to be more sensible given Perovich's language,
which specifically left open the possibility that Burdick's reasoning might control future
cases, the former view is more consistent with the history and purpose of the pardoning
power. Because of the ambiguity, courts occasionally make reference to the acceptance
requirement of Burdick. See, e.g., United States v. Noonan, 906 F.2d 952,958 (3d Cir. 1990)
(discussing the acceptance of a pardon as an admission of guilt); Lupo v. Zerbst, 92 F.2d
362, 365 (5th Cir. 1937) (finding that acceptance of a pardon includes acceptance of condi-
tions of the pardon).
88. See Hoffa v. Saxbe, 378 F. Supp. 1221, 1231 (D.D.C. 1974) (explaining that the
President, as the elected representative of the people, must always exercise the pardoning
power in the public interest).
89. Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256 (1974).
90. Id. at 258.
91. Id. at 266. Schick's case became more complicated when, pending appeal, the
United States Supreme Court decided Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), which held
that Georgia's death penalty statute, as statutorily implemented, constituted cruel and unu-
sual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution. As a result of Furman, all pending death cases were set aside, leaving
prisoners previously on death row serving life sentences without any conditions. Schick
argued that he was thus, after Furman, actually in a worse position than he would have been
had he never received a pardon. The Court disagreed, noting that Schick was better off
because his death sentence could have been carried out before Furman was decided. Schick,
419 U.S. at 259. Schick unsuccessfully argued that, even if the condition attached to his life
sentence was valid when imposed, the decision in Furman retroactively voided the condition
previously imposed by President Eisenhower. Schick 419 U.S. at 268 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
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Interpreting English law as it existed at the time of the Constitutional
Convention, and emphasizing that conditions were routinely imposed on
those pardoned by English kings, the Supreme Court rejected Schick's
claims. First, without expressly overruling Wilson, the Court dismissed the
acceptance requirement implicit in Wilson's treatment of the pardon as a
private contractual arrangement. The Court explained that a pardonee's
accepting a pardon resulted from an historical anomaly. Kings commonly
granted pardons on the condition that the pardonees be transported to
other places, often to the American colonies. However, a prisoner could
not be forced to leave without approval by an Act of Parliament, which was
rarely authorized. In order to circumvent this rule, pardoned prisoners
were asked to agree to banishment. 2 The Schick Court pointed out that
since the English prisoner was really only agreeing that his life should be
spared, consent was "a legal fiction at best. 93
Next, the Court concluded that legislative authorization was no longer
essential to the exercise of the pardoning power. Indeed, even after Parlia-
ment abolished banishment as a sentence, the King retained the power to
annex this condition to a pardon.94 Reviewing this English history, the
Court concluded that the pardoning power was generally intended to be
free from legislative control.95
Finally, the Schick Court analyzed the debates at the Constitutional
Convention on the nature of the pardoning power. The Court noted that
the draftsmen of Article II, Section 2, "spoke in terms of a 'prerogative' of
the President, which ought not be 'fettered or embarrassed., 96 The Court
observed that the debates indicate that the President was given the power
to pardon in order to deal with individual cases, unencumbered by legisla-
tive or judicial control.97 Indeed, the Court acknowledged, "[A]cts of
clemency inherently call for discriminatory choices because no two cases
are the same."98 The Court concluded that, "considerations of public pol-
icy and humanitarian impulses support an interpretation of [the pardoning
power] so as to permit the attachment of any condition which does not
otherwise offend the Constitution."9 9 Thus, in Schick, the Supreme Court
again recognized the pardoning power as an instrument for acting upon the
exceptional case where doing so would best serve the public interest.
Most recently, the Supreme Court again considered English history,
the debates at the Constitutional Convention, and its own earlier decisions
to reaffirm the pardoning power as indispensable to the fair administration
92. Schick, 419 U.S. at 261.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 262.
95. Id.
96. Id at 263 (quoting The Federalist No. 74 (Alexander Hamilton)).
97. Id at 265.
98. Id. at 268.
99. Id. at 266.
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of justice. In holding that a petition for habeas corpus was not the proper
forum for a death row prisoner bringing a claim of innocence eight years
after conviction, the Court in Herrera v. Collins relied on the fact that the
petitioner was not left without a forum for relief.100 The Court directed the
prisoner to the state's governor for consideration of clemency."01
B. California State Pardoning Power
1. The Constitutional Debate, 1849
Drawing on more than a half-century of experience under the federal
system, drafters of California's first constitution created a state pardoning
power very similar in form and in purpose to the federal pardoning power.
Most significantly, both the California Constitution and United States Con-
stitution vested the pardoning power in one person, the executive, and au-
thorized that individual to exercise it largely without limitation.
Nonetheless, the survival of California's pardoning power is remarkable
given the strong opposition to it at the California Constitutional Conven-
tion of 1889. Its staying power reflects the nearly universal acceptance of
its importance as a safety-net for the inevitable imperfections of a system of
justice that flows from the dual workings of a legislature and judiciary.
California's first constitution was adopted in 1849 by a convention
comprised largely of newly arrived immigrants who had come to California
during the Gold Rush."° Most had traveled long distances at great hard-
ship to try their fortune in a state with a population numbering only
50,000.103 Over the following thirty years, the state's population grew dra-
matically, and the economic, social, and political climate changed signifi-
cantly. Banks closed during the 1870s amid accusations of bad business
practice and misuse of funds, mining stocks collapsed, and agriculture and
manufacturing became the state's chief industries. Property became con-
centrated in the hands of a privileged few; and a slump in business resulted
in widespread unemployment.'0 Political corruption became wide-
spread.105 Working class persons, increasingly dissatisfied with economic
conditions and the political environment, began to form political parties,
precipitating a demand for reform at the California Constitutional Conven-
tion of 1878.106
A general distrust of politicians, among other issues, prompted recon-
sideration of the pardoning power. At an early meeting of the California
Constitutional Convention, members created thirty standing committees,
100. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993).
101. Id. at 415-20.
102. CARL BEr SWISHER, MOTIVATION AND POLITICAL TECHNIQUa IN ME CAM!-
FORNIA CONSrriTuONAL CONVENTION 1878-79 6 (1969).
103. Id.
104. Id. at 6, 9, 15-16.
105. Id. at 15.
106. Id. at 15-16.
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including the Committee on Pardoning Power (CPP), a nine-member
group formed to revise Article V, Section 13, of the state's original consti-
tution.107 Article V provided, in relevant part:
The Governor shall have the power to grant reprieves and
pardons after conviction, for all offenses, except treason and cases
of impeachment, upon such conditions and with such restrictions
and limitations as he may think proper, subject to such regulations
as may be provided by law relative to the manner of applying for
pardons. Upon conviction for treason, he shall have the power to
suspend the execution of the sentence until the case shall be re-
ported to the Legislature at its next meeting, when the Legislature
shall either pardon, direct the execution of the sentence, or grant
a further reprieve. He shall communicate to the Legislature, at
the beginning of every session, every case of reprieve or pardon
granted, stating the name of the convict, the crime of which he
was convicted, the sentence and its date, and the date of the par-
don or reprieve. 108
The CCP debated several challenges to the pardoning power during
the convention's subsequent meetings, including: 1) whether clemency
should be abolished; 2) whether clemency power should be partially
divested from the governor and allocated to other individuals or groups; 3)
whether clemency should be available only to those who had committed
certain offenses; 4) whether any restrictions should be placed upon the eli-
gibility of a person seeking clemency; and finally, 5) what, if any, control
the legislature should have over the grantor of clemency.
The strongest opposition to the pardoning power was expressed by
those who believed that the power had been corrupted, benefiting wealthy
and influential people at the expense of all others.109 One delegate felt so
strongly about what he perceived to be the corruption of the pardoning
power that his resolution would have prohibited the granting of clemency
to convicted prisoners even where newly discovered evidence suggested
that their sentences were unjust." 0 Following proposals to abolish clem-
ency outright"' were numerous proposals to limit it to cases of insanity, 12
107. 1 DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA, 1878-79, at 77 (1880) [hereinafter CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION].
108. Id. at 7. Note that under Article V, Section 13, the governor lacked the power to
commute sentences. Any person who was legally guilty and convicted could seek a full
pardon, but not a sentence reduction. Under the present California Constitution, the gover-
nor does have the power to commute sentences. CA.CONsT. art. V, § 8.
109. CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, supra note 107, at 278 (remarks of
Barry), 358 (remarks of Beerstecher), 368 (remarks of Smith).
110. Id. at 369 (remarks of Grace).
111. Id. at 368 (remarks of Smith).
112. Id. at 277 (remarks of Barnes).
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to cases of factual innocence established by the discovery of new evi-
dence113 or perjured testimony,114 or to cases where the governor found the
sentence unjust.'1 5 The delegates adopted none of these proposals.
Some delegates expressed concern that the governor was particularly
susceptible to personal and political pressure, and proposed that the par-
doning power be shared with the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, a
trial judge, the Attorney General, the Board of Wardens, the Commission
in Charge of State Prison, or the Legislature." 6 Other delegates argued
that the more people holding the pardoning power, the greater the risk that
pardons would become a commodity to be bought and sold,117 or that the
group would fail to take responsibility for the consequences of its clemency
decisions.'1 8 The delegates concluded that dispersal of the pardoning
power would result in a watered-down version of justice, and adopted no
proposal to divest the governor of the pardoning power.1 19 Ultimately, the
sole restriction placed upon the pardoning power was the exclusion of
twice-convicted felons from consideration for executive clemency. 2
While those who opposed the pardoning power commonly character-
ized it as the governor's arbitrary extension of mercy to those legally and
morally guilty of crimes, those who defended the pardoning power typically
emphasized its role in protecting the innocent. Delegate McCallum, for
example, argued:
[W]hen men shall devise a perfect government, when there
shall be no mistakes made in the administration of government,
then there will be no need of pardons in any case, because there
would be no suppositions that there could be any injustice done in
any case. But we are all liable to err. Jurors are liable to commit
errors; Judges are liable to commit errors; witnesses are liable to
make mistakes and misstatements. All human testimony is
fallible.12 1
Significantly, Delegate Terry explained how the pardoning power,
viewed by some as a device of corruption and favoritism and by others as a
shield for protecting victims of judicial error, could be used to produce just
results in complex cases:
[T]here may be mitigating circumstances which excuse the of-
fense in the minds of a large majority of the right- thinking people
113. Il at 279 (remarks of Blackmer).
114. Id. at 277 (remarks of Barnes).
115. IdM at 279 (remarks of Blackmer).
116. Id. at 257 (remarks of Timnin), 274 (remarks of Campbell), 278 (remarks of Barry
and Filcher).
117. Id. at 277 (remarks of Barnes).
118. Id. at 358 (remarks of Howard).
119. Id. at 277 (remarks of Barnes), 279 (remarks of Blackmer).
120. Id. at 1195.
121. Id. (remarks of McCallum).
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of the country. A man may commit murder under the influence
of a knowledge of an outrage upon his wife or sister, and be tech-
nically guilty, to be sure, but in such cases why should not the
Governor be allowed to pardon him? 122
Terry demonstrated that the pardoning power's importance in the fair
the administration of justice becomes quite clear in the context of those
cases where the defendant is guilty as a matter of law, but where strict
adherence to the letter of the law would produce unduly harsh results.
Despite contentious challenges to the retention of a broad pardoning
power, few restrictions ultimately were placed on the pardoning power, and
the majority of California delegates refused to divest the executive of clem-
ency power. The California delegates declined to limit its application to
certain types of cases, recognizing that decisions in numerous types of
cases, including some situations impossible to anticipate, could result in in-
justice. They appear to have agreed with their federal counterparts that
discretion, and the acceptance of responsibility for the exercise of that dis-
cretion, are indispensable parts of a system of justice.
The delegates' appreciation of the need for an executive power to rem-
edy the inadequacies of a sophisticated, but imperfect criminal justice sys-
tem defeated attempts to significantly restrict the pardoning power. The
need for a broad pardoning power was perhaps best articulated by Dele-
gate Howard:
A power to pardon seems indeed indispensable under the
most correct administration of the law by human tribunals, since
otherwise men would sometimes fall a prey to the vindictiveness
of accusers, the inaccuracy of testimony, and the fallibility of ju-
rors and Courts. Besides, the law may be broken, and yet the
offender placed in such circumstances that he will stand in a great
measure, and perhaps wholly, excused in moral and general jus-
tice, though not in the strictness of the law."2
While the governor may certainly exercise his discretion and decline
clemency in a particular case, any California governor who attempts to
redefine or limit the clemency power is acting contrary to the intent and
wisdom of the state constitution.
122. Id. at 357 (remarks of Terry).
123. Id. at 358 (remarks of Howard).
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2. The Pardoning Power in the California Courts
California clemency cases established early on that the federal and
state pardoning powers should be viewed as substantially identical,12 4 de-
spite their minor differences.' s Accordingly, California courts have
looked to the history of the federal pardoning power,2 6 as well as to the
extensive debates surrounding adoption of the California Constitution,a2
in interpreting the nature and purpose of California's pardoning power.
Like the federal courts, the California courts have consistently rejected
efforts to limit the executive's authority to exercise the power.128 The state
courts have interpreted the pardon as an act of mercy.12 9 They have also
emphasized its function as a safety-net that permits finality in the courts
and limits on appeals without compromising the dispensation of justice. In
124. In People v. Bowen, 43 Cal. 439, 441-42 (1872), the court stated:
The power of the Executive of the State to pardon offenses other than the offense
of treason or impeachable offenses, is conferred upon him by the [California] Con-
stitution.... His power in that respect is of the same general nature as that con-
ferred upon the President of the United States by the Federal Constitution.
125. While the President can pardon before and after conviction, Burdick, 236 U.S. at
86-87, the Governor of California can act only after conviction and sentencing. CA. Co.sr.
Art. V, § 8. In addition, the presidential pardoning power is unrestrained by legislative
control, while the California governor's pardoning power is subject to legislative regulations
relating to the manner of applying for a pardon. CAL PENAL. CoDE § 4800 et. seq. (West
1982).
126. See, e.g., Way v. Superior Court, 74 Cal. App.3d 165 (1977) (deciding that the
Legislature had not unconstitutionally usurped the governor's commutation power when it
repealed the Indeterminate Sentencing Law, replaced it with the Determinate Sentencing
Law and gave the new law retroactive effect, which had the effect of shortening the
sentences of some California prisoners). The court noted that, "of considerable importance
to our decision is the history of, the principles affecting, and the right to exercise the power
of [pardon]." Id. at 173-76 (referring extensively to the records of the debates at the Cali-
fornia Constitutional Convention).
127. See, e.g., Way v. Superior Court, 141 Cal. Rptr. 383, 389 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977)
(referring extensively to the records of the debates at the California Constitutional
Convention).
128. It is well-settled law in California that the powers of commutation and pardon are
held to be the exclusive domain of the Governor. People v. Odle, 230 P.2d 345, 348 (Cal.
1951); People v. Enriquez, 219 Cal. Rptr. 325, 330 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986); People v. Warren,
224 Cal. Rptr. 746,755 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986). Various claims that the governor's pardoning
power is limited in scope have been rejected. See, e.g., Ex parte Kelly, 99 P. 368, 369 (Cal.
1908) (holding that the executive is not disallowed from annexing any reasonable condition
to a pardon); In re Collie, 240 P. 2d 275, 276 (Cal. 1952) (stating that though the legislature
is authorized to prescribe conditions of parole, the governor has the power to withhold
parole as a condition of commutation: "A commutation is in the nature of a favor which
may be withheld entirely or granted upon such reasonable conditions, restrictions and limi-
tations as the governor may think proper."); Green v. Gordon, 246 P.2d 38, 39 (Cal. 1952)
(holding that a court's power to sentence does not limit the governor's power to issue a
commutation upon conditions).
129. See, e.g., Way, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 391 (concluding that true commutations are char-
acterized by forgiveness toward past offenders); People v. Mabry, 455 P.2d 759, 776 (Cal.
1969) (Peters, J., dissenting) (stating that the exercise of clemency is an exercise of grace
and compassion); Phyle v. Duffy, 208 P.2d 668, 677 (Cal. 1949) (Traynor, J., concurring)
(noting that the granting of executive clemency is recognized as an act of mercy).
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Ex Parte Lindley, °30 the court considered and rejected petitions for a writ
of habeas corpus and a writ of error coram vobis by a petitioner found
guilty and sentenced to death for the murder of a thirteen-year-old girl.
Adopting a posture prescient of the United States Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Herrera, the concurrence noted that though "the record leaves me
with grave doubt as to whether Lindley is guilty of the crime," such doubt
was insufficient to sustain a writ of habeas corpus and "[t]he remedy in
such cases is committed by our law exclusively to the governor of the
state."
13 1
In In re Horowitz132 the court again found the pardoning power to be
the exclusive remedy in cases of factual innocence where no judicial re-
course is available. Denying Horowitz's request for a writ of habeas
corpus, the court acknowledged that the "[p]etitioner undoubtedly has es-
tablished that at the trial there were disputed issues of fact and grave con-
flicts in the evidence.' 33 Nonetheless, the factual inconsistencies could not
support a habeas writ. The court concluded, "If at the end of court proce-
dures there is claimed to persist a miscarriage of justice, despite all the
precautions of the law to the contrary, the ultimate remedy rests in an ap-
peal to the governor. '134
This recognition of the importance of the pardoning power to concerns
of mercy and factual innocence has, unfortunately, led to the view adopted
by some - Governor Wilson apparently among them - that these are the
only legitimate functions of the pardoning power. But the history and de-
velopment of both the state and federal pardoning powers reveal that these
are not the only legitimate concerns. Indeed, at least two California cases
emphasize that the pardoning power is intended to enable the governor to
do justice when, for any reason, injustice has occurred.
In People v. Superior Court of San Francisco,135 Ullah Mohammed,
having lost all his appeals, filed a civil suit in the Superior Court wherein he
asked the court to vacate his judgment of convictiohi for murder in the first
degree, and to issue an injunction to stay the execution of his death sen-
tence. Mohammed argued that he had not received a fair trial, as he was
deprived, by fraud, of his opportunity to present a defense. When the Su-
perior Court issued the injunction, the State brought a writ of prohibition
in the California Supreme Court to prohibit the Superior Court from pro-
ceeding with the suit. The California Supreme Court issued the writ of
prohibition, concluding that no court had the power to hear Mohammed's
suit or to grant the relief requested by Mohammed. The court held that, in
130. Ex Parte Lindley, 177 P.2d 918 (Cal. 1947).
131. Lindley, 177 P.2d at 930 (Schauer, J., concurring)
132. In re Horowitz, 203 P.2d 513 (Cal. 1949).
133. Id. at 521.
134. Id.
135. People v. Superior Court of San Francisco, 213 P. 945 (Cal. 1923).
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circumstances such as these, the remedy provided for by law is an applica-
tion to the governor. 6 The court explained:
The constitutional grant to the Governor of the right to par-
don is to enable the state to do justice in those cases where the
ordinary procedure results in injustice in individual cases by reason
of extrinsic fraud or for any other reason. There is thus a proce-
dure established for the purpose of doing justice in this type of
cases [sic], and we must assume that, if, as claimed here, Ullah
Mohammed did not have a fair trial, and for the reasons he al-
leges in his complaint has not been able to present his defense, an
application to the Governor for pardon will be given due consid-
eration, and, if the representations are there made on his behalf
that have been made here, and are established to the satisfaction
of the Governor, that he will extend to him such a degree of leni-
ency as is proper under the circumstances.137
Thus, the California Supreme Court made it clear that executive clem-
ency gives the governor the power to remedy injustice that has resulted for
any reason, and that the pardoning power may be exercised in order to
correct trial errors no longer reviewable by a court.
The California Supreme Court reiterated this principle in People v.
Reid. 8 The defendant in Reid was convicted of murder in the first degree.
His motion for a new trial was denied, and his conviction affirmed on ap-
peal. Reid filed a petition for a writ of error coram nobis in the trial court,
alleging that his conviction should be reversed because of juror miscon-
duct.3 9 In support of his application, the defendant referred to affidavits
attached to a petition for commutation of sentence that he had already
filed with the governor. The trial court denied the application, believing
that it had no jurisdiction to grant it.14°
On review of the trial court's denial, and after an extensive examina-
tion of the English and early American history of the writ of error coram
nobis, the California Supreme Court concluded that the writ was not avail-
able to the defendant, and affirmed the denial of the petition.1 41 The court
noted that there was no law sustaining the application for a writ, and no
other judicial remedy available.' 42 The court concluded that the governor,
136. lML at 945.
137. Id. (emphasis added).
138. People v. Reid, 232 P. 457 (Cal. 1924).
139. Id. at 459.
140. Id
141. Id- at 462.
142. Id
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not the court, was empowered and qualified to investigate the facts sur-
rounding the defendant's allegations, and that the remedy available to Reid
-an executive pardon -rested with the governor. 43
These cases emphasize the symbiotic nature of the relationship be-
tween the clemency power and judicial review. In order to promote finality
in criminal cases, and to limit what might otherwise be an endless series of
appeals, the California courts have recognized that they inevitably sacrifice
justice in some cases. They have justified this sacrifice by pointing out that
the system as a whole still provides a remedy - the executive pardon -
particularly, though not exclusively, in cases in which the facts giving rise
to the injustice may not be cognizable by the courts. Thus, the California
courts have recognized, from the time of the Constitution forward, that the
pardoning power is not merely an instrument of mercy to be utilized at the
governor's discretion, but constitutes an integral part of our system of
justice.
II.
RESTRICTIONS ON POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
While our criminal courts may strive to produce just results, they can-
not possibly permit every criminal case to be endlessly relitigated, A judi-
cial system needs a measure of finality. Criminal cases can generate new
evidence, procedural challenges, and claims of legal error years after the
conviction. Moreover, prisoners have powerful incentives to proceed with
new appeals. Accordingly, our criminal justice system, even as it may seek
to safeguard the rights of criminal defendants, must impose some limits on
appeals.
Almost any limit placed on appeals, however, creates a risk of injus-
tice. Given the current trend toward confining criminal litigation to the
trial and appellate courts, adequate judicial remedies for addressing post-
conviction claims have become fewer in number and more limited in scope.
Governor Wilson's refusal to revisit legal issues on clemency review no
doubt will exacerbate the harshness of judicially-created procedural hur-
dles to post-conviction relief.
The primary post-conviction means of challenging a criminal convic-
tion is the writ of habeas corpus. 144 Habeas corpus challenges the constitu-
tionality of a prisoner's custody and demands the prisoner's release. 145 The
143. Id.
144. See generally NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS-STATE JUSTICE INSTITUTE,
HABEAS CORPUS IN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 1 (1994) [hereinafter HABEAS CoR'us
IN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS] (discussing habeas corpus in the United States). There
were over 10,000 habeas corpus petitions filed by state prisoners in 1991. Id. at 14 tbl.1.
145. See generally JAMES S.LIEBMAN & RANDY HERTZ, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUs
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 13-18 (2d ed. 1994) [hereinafter LIEBMAN & HERTZ] (explain-
ing that federal habeas corpus review is limited to claims of federal constitutional error). 28
U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (1996). State habeas relief provided by the California courts extends to
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writ acts as a judicial safety-net for the criminal justice system, providing
the state prisoner with her last chance for judicial review. In recent years,
habeas corpus has become an increasingly narrow avenue for post-convic-
tion relief." s Federal and state courts have begun to marginalize habeas as
a means of remedying serious errors in the trial process because of con-
cerns over federalism, comity, finality, and the scarcity of judicial re-
sources.1 47 This trend toward depriving prisoners of meaningful habeas
review leaves clemency review as the only process by which errors may be
remedied.
This section outlines the evolving relationship between clemency re-
view and habeas corpus. It lays the foundation for my conclusion that com-
prehensive clemency review is an indispensable safety-net for the unjustly
convicted.
A. Herrera v. Collins
Leonel Torres Herrera was found guilty of shooting and killing a po-
lice officer along a stretch of Texas highway, convicted of capital murder,
and sentenced to death.' c The evidence against him included the officer's
dying declaration identifying Herrera as the killer, a police officer's eyewit-
ness identification, blood evidence found on Herrera's jeans, and a written
mea culpa found on Herrera when he was arrested. 4 9 Herrera's conviction
was affirmed on appeal to the Texas Supreme Court.25 0
constitutional error, jurisdictional error, and claims of newly discovered evidence. In re
Clark, 5 Cal. 4th 750,767 (Cal. 1993).
146. LmBmAN & HERTZ, supra note 145, at v. ("The road to federal habeas corpus
relief for state prisoners was already an obstacle course in 1988.... Today the road has
become a narrower, more tortuous track among concealed stake-pits and anti-personnel
mines calculated to daze cartographers and daunt a modem Gilgamesh'). Id.
147. See, e.g., Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991) (holding that the "independ-
ent and adequate state grounds" doctrine prohibits federal habeas review of federal consti-
tutional claims waived under state procedural rules):
In the habeas context, the application of the independent and adequate state
ground doctrine is grounded in concerns of comity and federalism. Without the
rule, a federal district court would be able to do in habeas what this court could not
do on direct review- habeas would offer state prisoners whose custody was sup-
ported by independent and adequate state grounds an end run around the limits of
this Court's jurisdiction and a means to undermine the State's interest in enforcing
its laws.
Id. at 730-31. If the federal court's habeas watchwords are "federalism" and "comity," the
California court's anxiety about habeas is primarily focused on concerns over finality and
the integrity of the appellate process. See In re Clark, 5 Cal. 4th 750 (Cal. 1993) (discussing
California's judicially created procedural restrictions on state habeas review):
Procedural rules have been established by our past decisions to govern petititions
for writs of habeas corpus. Such rules are necessary both to deter use of the writ to
unjustifiably delay implementation of the law, and to avoid the need to set aside
final judgments of conviction when retrial would be difficult or impossible.
Id. at 764.
148. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993).
149. d. at 394-95.
150. Id. at 395.
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Herrera's first round of state and federal habeas petitions was unsuc-
cessful.'15  Herrera then initiated a second state habeas petition alleging,
for the first time, that he was factually innocent of the murder.' 52 In his
second petition, Herrara presented three affidavits indicating that his de-
ceased brother, Raul Herrera, had killed the police officer.15 3 Three of the
affiants reported that Raul had admitted to the murder in their presence.1 54
One of the affiants was a former state judge, who as a lawyer had repre-
sented Raul in an unrelated criminal matter. 5 5 The former state judge also
alleged that Raul and the murdered officer had been involved in drug traf-
ficking together. 56 Herrera added a fourth affiant on his second federal
habeas petition. In this affidavit, Raul's son gave a first-hand account of
how, as a nine year-old child, he had witnessed his father, not Leonel Her-
rera, kill the officer.' 57
The United States Supreme Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, affirmed a federal court of appeals' denial of habeas relief. The
Court held that Herrera's "actual innocence" claim, standing alone, was
not cognizable by the federal courts on habeas review because such a claim
did not present a constitutional issue.' 58 "[Fjederal habeas courts sit to
ensure that individuals are not imprisoned in violation of the Constitution,"
the majority wrote, "not to correct errors in fact." 15 9 Upon conviction, the
Court reasoned, the presumption of innocence vanishes regardless of any
newly-discovered exculpatory evidence, and the prisoner becomes "legally
guilty."' 6 ° A federal habeas court bases its analysis on a presumption of
legal guilt, thus an assertion of "actual innocence" without an accompany-
ing constitutional claim is insufficient to support the habeas petition.
Having rejected Herrera's habeas petition, Chief Justice Rehnquist as-
serted that for a prisoner with newly-discovered exculpatory evidence, ex-
ecutive clemency acts as "the 'fail-safe' in our criminal justice system. '161
Leonel Herrera, the majority assured, was not without a forum. Although
the judicial system is "fallible," Rehnquist continued, "history is replete
with examples of wrongfully convicted persons who have been pardoned in
the wake of after-discovered evidence establishing their innocence.' 162
151. Id. at 396. At this stage, Herrera challenged the identification evidence as unrelia-
ble and improperly admitted. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 396.
154. Id.
155. Id. at n.2.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 397.
158. Id. at 404.
159. Id. at 400.
160. Id. at 425.
161. Id. at 415.
162. Id.
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The Court cited sixty-five cases in which it was later determined the de-
fendant had been wrongfully convicted. Clemency, the Court stated, had
provided relief in forty-seven of these cases.163 The Court concluded that
clemency was the proper mechanism for addressing claims of actual inno-
cence in circumstances where judicial relief was unavailable.1"
Insofar as Herrera emphasized the role of executive clemency in reme-
dying injustices in certain types of cases, the decision was extremely impor-
tant. Herrera reaffirmed the principle that it is an executive's obligation to
exercise clemency review in those cases where courts or legislation restrict,
or totally eliminate, a prisoner's access to post-conviction corrective re-
view. The Court's stark reminder that "[c]laims of actual innocence based
on newly discovered evidence have never been held to state a ground for
federal habeas relief absent an independent constitutional violation occur-
ring in the underlying state criminal proceeding" 6 makes clear that the
exercise of clemency is sometimes the only mechanism capable of compen-
sating for judicial system shortcomings.
Accordingly, the role of clemency depends on identifying the limita-
tions of the system in which it operates. As legislatures and the courts cut
back on the procedural protections that once permitted the justice system
more leeway to do justice in individual cases, the need to reconsider the
role of clemency in our own time is becoming particularly urgent. After
Herrera, it is especially important for the executive branch to understand
the ever more onerous barriers being placed by the judiciary and legisla-
tures on prisoners seeking post-conviction relief. Only then will state gov-
ernors fully appreciate the scope of their duty to provide comprehensive
clemency review for the unjustly convicted.
B. Restrictions on Post-Conviction Relief
After a period of expansion, Supreme Court rulings since 1976 have
steadily restricted the scope of habeas relief.16 These restrictions have
163. Id. at 420 (citing E. BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE INNOCrNr (1932)).
164. Id. The Court cited the fact that all thirty-six states with the death penalty also had
statutorily authorized executive clemency. Id. at 414 n.14.
165. Id. at 400.
166. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (stating that habeas claims based on the
Fourth Amendment cannot be relitigated because state court had provided full and fair
opportunity to litigate); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977) (requiring habeas appli-
cants who procedurally defaulted on a claim in state court to show cause and prejudice);
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (stating that newly articulated constitutional rules of
criminal procedure are not applicable to cases which became final before the new rule was
announced); McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467 (1991) (requiring successive habeas petitions
to show cause and prejudice to include a claim omitted from first petition); Brecht v. Abra-
hamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993) (requiring prisoner to show constitutional error had a "sub-
stantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict," a more difficult
standard than the former "harmless error" standard).
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been severely criticized by practitioners and academic commentators, 167
but there is little indication that the trend will reverse itself. Restrictions
on habeas relief became even more severe when Congress passed the An-
titerrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA).168 This
section reviews the numerous practical and procedural restrictions on a
prisoner who seeks relief through a habeas writ.
1. Practical Restrictions: A Petition from Behind Bars
A 1994 study reveals that the typical habeas petitioner is doing "hard
time," with a median minimum sentence of twenty-four years. 169 Given the
procedural hurdles to habeas relief, only prisoners sentenced to long terms
have time to complete the steps necessary for filing a habeas petition.
170
Nearly all petitioners were represented by court-appointed counsel at
trial.171 States are not obligated under the Sixth Amendment to provide
counsel to needy prisoners seeking post-conviction relief.172 Most petition-
ers were not represented through the filing of their habeas petitions. Sev-
enty-five percent of petitioners in state court and ninety-one percent in
federal court represented themselves, frequently in handwritten
scribblings.'7 3
Ineffective assistance of counsel is the most common habeas claim in
both state and federal courts. 174 Claims of due process violation, Eighth
Amendment abridgment, trial court error, and prosecutorial misconduct
167. See, e.g., Stephen B. Bright, Does the Bill of Rights Apply Here Any More?,
CHAMPION, Nov. 20, 1996, at 25; Emmanuel Margolis, Habeas Corpus: The No-Longer
Great Writ, 98 DicK. L. REv. 557 (1994) (arguing that the increasing emphasis by the
Supreme Court on "actual innocence" and "innocence of death" in recent habeas law is a
"trap for the unwary and a 'catch 22' for the wary."); Ronald J. Tabak & J. Mark Lane,
Judicial Activism and Legislative "Reform" of Federal Habeas Corpus: A Critical Analysis of
Recent Developments and Current Proposals, 55 A.B. L. REv. 1 (1991) (describing the ways
in which judicial "reform" of habeas law has eliminated the writ of habeas corpus to many
death row inmates).
168. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub. L. No.
104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996).
169. HABEAS CORPUS IN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 144, at 35-38
(1994).
170. Id. at 35. The study reveals that, for death row inmates, a median time of 2,319
days passes between conviction and ffling of federal habeas petitions, and 1,873 days elapses
for state habeas petitions.
171. Id. at 36. The competency of trial counsel has become key as heightened restric-
tions on habeas corpus suggest that an accused's fate will be increasingly and finally decided
at the trial level. For a thorough discussion of how restrictions on habeas corpus affect
defendants who must rely on appointed trial counsel see Debra Cassens Moss, Death,
Habeas and Good Lawyers: Balancing Fairness and Finality, 78 A.B.A. J. 82 (1992). See
also Ellen Kreitzberg, Death Without Justice, 35 SANTA CLARA L.REv. 485 (1995).
172. Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1 (1989) (concluding that no habeas counsel is
required in a capital case); Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987) (determining that no
habeas counsel is required in a noncapital case).
173. HABEAS CORPUS IN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 144at 39.
174. Id. at 45. Between forty and fifty percent of habeas claims assert ineffective assist-
ance of counsel. Id. at 46.
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are also asserted frequently.175 Nearly all petitions fail. The success rate
for all state habeas petitions filed in the four states represented in the study
was just under five percent;176 for federal claims, the overall success rate
was less than one percent."7 In light of related studies that have examined
the prevalence of constitutional error in the judicial process, these figures
are remarkable. For example, in an amicus curiae brief, the NAACP Legal
Defense and Education Fund stated that federal appellate courts have
found constitutional error in seventy-three percent of death penalty
cases.178 Another recent study concluded that forty-three percent of state
capital judgments reviewed on habeas corpus in the state and federal courts
between 1976 and mid-1991 were determined, after final review, to be con-
stitutionally flawed.'79 These studies confirm that the presence of constitu-
tional error is not unusual, even in our most serious criminal proceedings.
Nonetheless, habeas relief is rarely granted.
2. Federal Procedural Restrictions on Habeas Corpus
Beyond the practical difficulties of filing a habeas petition, procedural
bars to habeas corpus review also prevent many prisoners from having the
merits of their post-conviction claims heard by a habeas court. These re-
strictions have been made increasingly burdensome in recent years by both
the Supreme Court and Congress.
Statute of Limitations. While prisoners used to have unlimited time to
bring a federal constitutional challenge, as long as there was no prejudice
to the respondent state,180 the AEDPA has imposed a one-year statute of
limitations on habeas petitions.18 1 This statute of limitations has had the
most immediate and most serious impact on prisoners seeking habeas re-
lief. The one-year time limit runs from the date the judgment became final,
either through exhaustion of direct appeals or expiration of the time for
seeking direct review." ' The average time it currently takes prisoners to
175. Id. at 45-60.
176. Id. at 62, tbl.7. It is important to note this figure is inflated by the 11 percent
success rate of excessive bail claims under the Eighth Amendment, where the "relief"
granted amounts to a lowering of bail. I&
177. HABEAs CoRPus IN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 144, at 62, tbl.17.
178. Brief Amicus Curiae for the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc. at
27, Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1987) (No. 82-6080).
179. Randal Samborn, Habeas Corpus Statistics Reveal Caseload is Light, NAT'L L.J.,
Oct. 17, 1994, at A19 (citing 1992 research findings by Professor James S. Liebman of the
Columbia University School of Law).
180. RuLEs GOVERNING § 2254 CASES iN THE U.S. DisTRicr CoURTs Rule 9(a).
181. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) (1996) (as amended by AEDPA § 101, (1996)).
182. Id. § 2244(d)(1) also specifies three other dates which could start the clock ticking,
including the date when the impediment (if any) to filing state post-conviction remedy was
removed, the date when the Supreme Court articulates a new, retroactively applicable
claim, and the date when the factual predicate of the claim became available. Id. The clock
starts ticking on the latest of the dates.
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fie a federal habeas petition is far longer than 365 days. 18 3 Once the 365
days have lapsed, however, the prisoner is barred from filing a federal
habeas corpus petition, no matter how meritorious her constitutional
claims. The AEDPA provides for no exceptions.
Procedural Default. Prior to 1977, state prisoners could raise a consti-
tutional issue in the federal habeas court as long as the petitioner's failure
to raise it in state appellate court had not been deliberate. 18' Wainwright v.
Sykes 85 replaced this generous "deliberate bypass" rule with a more re-
strictive test that required the applicant to show both "cause" for her fail-
ure to assert the claim and "actual prejudice" from the omission. 186 The
cause and actual prejudice standard is a significant impediment to federal
habeas relief. Most notably, attorney ignorance, inadvertence, or error that
results in a procedural default does not constitute "cause."' 187 Emphasizing
the importance of promoting finality of criminal convictions and federalism
concerns, 8" the Court has concluded that there was "no inequity in requir-
ing [prisoners] to bear the risk of attorney error that results in a procedural
default."' 89
Standard of Review. The standard used by the habeas court to review
state court convictions has become more deferential, making it more diffi-
cult for petitioners. In an appellate case, federal constitutional error at trial
is grounds for the reversal of a criminal conviction unless the appellate
court finds that the error was "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt."' 90
After the Court's 1993 ruling in Brecht v. Abrahamson,'91 however, the
habeas standard became more deferential than the appellate standard. In
habeas cases, the prosecution is relieved from establishing harmless error
183. Habeas Corpus in State and Federal Courts, supra note 144, at 86, tbl.22 The
study determined that for death row inmates a median of 2,319 days passed between convic-
tion and filing of federal habeas petitions and 1,873 days elapsed for state habeas petitions.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, a state prisoner must generally "exhaust" all of his state
appellate remedies before filing for federal habeas. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1996).
184. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 439 (1963).
185. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
186. Id at 87.
187. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 486-87 (1986). The harsh consequences of this
rule were highlighted in Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 753 (1991), where defense
counsel, unfamiliar with Virginia's 30-day filing period, filed the petitioner's appeal one day
late. The Supreme Court held that "attorney ignorance or inadvertence is not 'cause' be-
cause the attorney is the petitioner's agent when acting or failing to act, in furtherance of
the litigation, and the petitioner must "bear the risk of attorney error." Coleman, 501 U.S.
at 753.
188. Carrier, 477 U.S. at 487.
189. Id. at 478.
190. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967).
191. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993).
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"beyond a reasonable doubt." To defeat a habeas claim, the prosecution
need only show it was "highly probable" that the error was harmless.192
The AEDPA altered the standard of review in an even more dramatic
way. Prior to the statute, habeas courts followed the traditional appellate
standard of review and considered legal questions de novo. Under 28
U.S.C. §2254(d), as amended by AEDPA, a federal habeas court must now
determine whether the state court decision was "contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law." 1 3 The Sev-
enth Circuit, sitting en banc, recently interpreted the new provision to
mean that even if a federal judge determined that the state judge made a
mistake about the federal constitutional rights of the prisoner, the federal
judge must make an additional determination that the mistake was "unrea-
sonable" before she can grant habeas relief.1 4 It remains to be seen how
deferential federal courts will be to state courts' determinations of federal
Constitutional claims, but even the most narrow reading of the new section
2254(d) restricts the ability of prisoners to have a federal court make a de
novo judgment on her Constitutional claims.'19
Exhaustion. In the interest of federalism and comity, federal courts
generally require that the habeas petitioner first exhaust her claims in state
court. In 1982, the Supreme Court made this requirement more difficult
for petitioners by ruling that if a petition contains any unexhausted claims,
the entire petition (not just the unexhausted claims) must be denied and
remanded to state court. 19 6 However, the federal court could reach the
merits of the unexhausted constitutional claim if the federal judge deter-
mined that the state court had implicitly waived the exhaustion require-
ment by ignoring the exhaustion defect.197
The AEDPA amended 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) to close this loophole:
states must now explicitly waive the exhaustion requirement, and federal
192. Id. at 633. The Court reasoned that the threat to state sovereignty over criminal
proceedings which the "extraordinary remedy" of habeas corpus poses justified the adop-
tion of a more permissive standard. Id. For more in-depth analysis of the new Brecht stan-
dard, see James S. Liebman & Randy Hertz, Brecht v. Abrahamson, Harmfid Error in
Habeas Corpus, 84 J. CRim L. & Cimi. 1109 (1994); John H. Blume & Stephen P. Garvey,
Harmless Error in Federal Habeas After Brecht v. Abrahamson, 35 Wb. & MARY L. REv.
163 (1993).
193. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (1996) (as amended by AEDPA (1996)).
194. Lindh v. Murphy, 96 F.3d 856, 876-77 (7th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
195. For a narrow reading of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), see Brief for Petitioner, Lindh v.
Murphy, 96 F.3d 856 (7th Cir. 1996) (No. 96-6298) (arguing that § 2254(d) requires federal
courts to defer to state courts only if the state court actually adjudicated the merits of the
federal constitutional claim).
196. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982).
197. Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129 (1987).
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courts cannot decide that the state court had implicitly waived.198 The stat-
ute makes an exception to this exhaustion requirement when the federal
court wishes to deny the habeas petition. 99
Successive Petitions. The restrictions on filing successive habeas peti-
tions have also become increasingly hostile to the prisoner. Prior to 1991,
the rule on successive petitions was that federal claims which had not been
presented in previous petitions were allowed, as long as the omission was
based on a good-faith assessment of available claims.200 As an "abuse of
the writ," a bad-faith omission could not be included in successive peti-
tions. The Supreme Court issued a new rule in McCleskey v. Zant,201 re-
quiring the petitioner to show "cause" for her omission and "actual
prejudice" from the omission. Even though the McCleskey "cause and ac-
tual prejudice" test made successive petitions extremely difficult, the
AEDPA mandated an even stricter test.2° Under the amended 28 U.S.C.
§ 2244(b), a petitioner must show extreme prejudice: the facts underlying
the omitted claim must "be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing
evidence that, but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would
have found the applicant guilty" of the offense.2 °3
3. State Restrictions on Habeas Corpus
California state prisoners seeking state habeas relief based on alleged
constitutional error also face formidable procedural bars. As with federal
habeas petitions, California's appellate courts severely restrict multiple
habeas petitions that raise "successive" or "abusive" claims.204 California's
judicially-created Waltreus Rule states that "in the absence of strong justifi-
cation, any issue that was actually raised and rejected on appeal cannot be
renewed in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus."2 °5 At the same time,
another rule holds that an unjustified failure to present an issue on appeal
will generally preclude its consideration in a post-conviction petition for a
writ of habeas corpus.2 °6 Together, these rules prevent a prisoner from il-
ing a state habeas claim if she raised that claim unsuccessfully on direct
appellate review, or if she unjustifiably failed to raise that claim on direct
198. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(3) (1996) (as amended by AEDPA (1996)).
199. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2) (1996) (as amended by AEDPA (1996)).
200. Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963); 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) (1990)
201. McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467 (1991).
202. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) (1996) (as amended by AEDPA (1996)).
203. Id.
204. See In re Clark, 5 Cal. 4th 750 (Cal. 1993) (clarifying the exceptions to the general
rule that California courts will not entertain delayed or repetitious claims on state habeas
review).
205. In re Harris, 855 P.2d 391 (Cal. 1993).
206. In re Dixon, 41 Cal. 2d 756, 759 (Cal. 1953).
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appellate review. The state supreme court has carved out only a very nar-
row (and quite vague) exception to these rules for claims premised on con-
stitutional error?0 7
4. Restriction on Habeas Corpus: A Summary and Prospective
Clearly, habeas corpus is not a panacea for flawed criminal proceed-
ings. Indeed, the Supreme Court emphasized in Herrera that habeas
corpus is not designed to guarantee error-free trials; the real "fail-safe",
according to the Court, is the executive pardon2 03 Herrera's characteriza-
tion of the executive pardon as the criminal justice system's fail-safe, how-
ever, can only be realized if the executive is willing to revisit the substance
of habeas claims denied under established judicial standards. Clemency re-
view can offer no fail-safe protection if the executive is unwilling to exer-
cise discretion beyond that exercised by the judiciary. The role of
executive clemency as articulated in Herrera presupposes a governor's vll-
ingness to bring about a just resolution when the judicial system cannot.
Governor Wilson's stated intent to use the pardon only as an act of grace
or in cases of factual innocence flies in the face of Herrera, and leaves
habeas corpus the exclusive post-conviction forum for challenging judicial
error.
In the following section, I argue that the unavoidable flaws in our
judicial system require that clemency review be comprehensive: the state
executive must take into account not only considerations of mercy or fac-
tual innocence, but principles of justice as well. Under Governor Wilson's
view, meritorious claims for post-conviction relief denied review by the
courts cannot be addressed by the executive because the application of es-
tablished procedural and substantive rules, including those relating to
habeas corpus, is within the exclusive domain of the judiciary. Under the
principles of comprehensive and flexible clemency review, however, the
scope of review is essentially unlimited. The Governor has not only wide
discretion to perform acts of mercy, but a constitutional obligation to use
clemency as an instrument of justice as well.
III.
ANALYsIS
The exercise of clemency has been controversial. Unfortunately, the
controversy has tended to focus on the nature of the particular case or the
personalities involved rather than on the operation of the justice system
itself. This emphasis is misguided. Without giving careful attention to the
207. See In re Harris, 5 Cal. 4th 831, 836 (Cal. 1993) ("We recognize the possibility that
in rare situations, there may be some clear and fundamental constitutional violations striking
at the heart of the trial process that should have been raised or were unsuccessfully raised
on appeal") (emphasis added).
208. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390,415 (1993).
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capacity of the criminal justice system to render a fair result in a given case,
the reach of clemency is inadequate. Pardoning power review must encom-
pass the executive's honest evaluation of whether the justice system has
dealt adequately with the case and whether the procedures for habeas
corpus and other appellate review were satisfactory.
The executive was given the pardoning power to serve two general
purposes: (1) to dispense mercy when the system is too harsh in an individ-
ual case and, (2) to mete out justice when the system proves itself incapable
of reaching a just result.20 9 When clemency is exercised for mercy reasons,
it is to minimize the undue harshness of an otherwise effective and fair
system of laws. When exercised for justice reasons, it is to make up for
inadequacies or failures within that system of laws. Generally, these fail-
ures occur either because a procedural rule prevents the courts from reach-
ing the merits of a "good" claim or because an established legal standard is
insufficiently flexible to achieve justice in a particular situation.
In this final section, I review three scenarios that call upon the Gover-
nor to extend clemency. In the first scenario, clemency is exercised primar-
ily for reasons of mercy. In these cases, clemency is used to temper harsh
results in a retribution-based judicial system. In the second scenario, clem-
ency is appropriate when a procedural bar prevents the judicial system
from reaching the substance of a claim. In the third scenario, the executive
exercises clemency because the appellate or habeas court's application of
an established rule of law is inconsistent with principles of justice.
In the second and third scenarios, clemency is exercised in a manner
that compensates for the judicial system's failure to deliver a just result. In
these cases the executive must be willing to revisit procedural, evidentiary,
and substantive legal issues on clemency review in order to comply with
constitution-based directives to achieve justice.
To illustrate these different grounds for clemency, I focus on battered
women whose claims of self-defense either were not presented at trial or
were presented in ways that prevented their full consideration by the jury.
The women were then convicted of killing their abusers. For the typical
battered woman seeking clemency, the issues unique to her self-defense
claims may not have been presented at all at trial, or likely were subject to
procedural barriers that unfairly marginalized their significance. The pris-
oner may have exhausted her direct appeals without full consideration of
the issues, and any efforts to raise them through habeas claims may be
limited by procedural obstacles or onerous standards of review. This is
often true even in circumstances where, were the trial held today, the
claims might lead the finder of fact to a verdict of not guilty. Accordingly,
at least some of these cases squarely test the role of clemency as a safety-
209. These purposes have been characterized as "justice enhancing" and "justice neu-
tral." See Kobil, Quality of Mercy, supra note 30, at 579.
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net for a functioning system of justice. These cases are particularly appro-
priate to illuminate the role of clemency, in part because incarcerated bat-
tered women have filed many highly publicized clemency petitions
nationwide, with different responses by executives in different states210
In addition, battered women's cases -in a manner not unlike the
claims of young Katherine Passeavant -involve issues many states did not
consider when they adopted statutes on homicide and self-defense. The
judiciary, therefore, was not prepared to address the issue in any systematic
fashion. The level of scholarly understanding and expertise in the area of
battered women's criminal trials has grown and changed dramatically over
a relatively short period.211 This increased theoretical sophistication has
paralleled popular attitudes about the fairness of the law's treatment of
battered women, as the silence and stigma that have traditionally sur-
rounded domestic violence slowly have given way to recognition of its per-
vasiveness across class lines.
A final reason for focusing on cases involving battered women is that
they illustrate the way in which the principles of justice and mercy must
both be considered in the decision to pardon. Clemency review must be
comprehensive rather than merely based on mercy. While the plight of the
battered woman seems tailor-made for a pure act of grace, these examples
show that acts of executive mercy, uncoupled with justice-based factors,
undermine both the integrity and constitutional purpose of executive
clemency.
A. Scenario I: Discretionary Considerations of Clemency and the Quality
of Mercy
Since taking office, Governor Wilson has granted clemency in three
cases. In one case, the petition was brought posthumously on behalf of
Jack Ryan, a man wrongly convicted 68 years earlier, and in two of the
cases, the petitioners were battered women.212 Governor Wilson granted
210. Since 1978, at least 102 battered women from 22 states have received clemency. In
some cases, the petitioner's victimization as a battered woman was not the basis for the
grant. See National Clearinghouse for the Defense of Battered Women, Battered Women
Who Have Received Clemency: 1978-1996 (1996)(unpublished annotated bibliography) (on
file with the National Clearinghouse of Battered Women). This annotated bibliography lists
articles, cases and litigation materials relating to battered women.
211. Id As of April 1996, the bibliography contained more than 2,000 listings, the
overwhelming majority of which date from the 1980's and 1990's. See, e.g., Holly Maguigan,
Battered Women and Self-Defense: Myths and Misconceptions in Current Reform Proposals,
140 U. PA. L. REv. 379 (1991) (discussing the legal claim of self defense in cases of battered
women who kill their abusers).
212. Dave Lesher, Dead Man's Name Finally to Be Cleared, L.A. TimEs, April 15,
1996, at Al.
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clemency to Brenda Axis because he "sympathized with the pain and ter-
ror"2 13 she suffered at the hands of her abuser. He granted clemency to 78
year-old Frances Caccavale because of her "advanced years and deteriorat-
ing medical condition. 2 14
In both cases, the Governor's acts were motivated by his personal sym-
pathy for these women, without concern for the application of the underly-
ing law or the decision of the court that administered it. The use of
clemency for reasons of mercy is not in serious debate, although, little at-
tention has been given to what are proper considerations for a mercy based
pardon.
The idea of a pardon for mercy may be misleading, for it suggests that
it is proper for an executive to pardon someone simply out of pity. Justice
Blackmun's dissent in Herrera highlighted the importance of comprehen-
sive, rather than merely mercy-based, clemency review, "The vindication of
rights guaranteed by the Constitution has never been made to turn on the
unreviewable discretion of an executive official of administrative tribu-
nal .... If the exercise of a legal right turns on 'an act of grace,' than we no
longer live under a government of laws. ' 215 The history and development
of the pardoning power in the United States and within the individual
states make clear that there are standards that must be upheld in the exer-
cise of pardons. When proper standards are overlooked, the integrity of
the executive's act comes into question and public confidence is under-
mined. While compassion may have a proper role in the exercise of clem-
ency, compassion alone is not enough to support a pardon.
Governor Wilson's pardon of Frances Caccavale on grounds of ad-
vancing age and failing health was presented as an act of mercy. Whether
such a pardon is just, however, depends on the relative harshness of the
punishment and the gravity of the offense in light of the circumstances. In
weighing these considerations, it would be proper for the Governor to con-
sider, for example, that a fifteen year prison sentence may be harsher on a
prisoner not expected to survive the sentence, or on one whose physical
condition would result in much greater suffering, than the identical sen-
tence imposed on a younger prisoner in good health. It is also proper to
consider the circumstances of the subject's crime. In Caccavale's case, Wil-
son's clemency review could have considered the acts of violence by the
decedent over the four decades of their marriage and the probability that,
but for her victimization as a battered woman, Caccavale would not have
213. Executive Decision, Hon. Pete Wilson, Governor of the State of California, In the
Matter of the Clemency Request of Brenda Axis 5 (May 27, 1993) [hereinafter Executive
Decision Axs].
214. Executive Decision, Hon. Pete Wilson, Governor of the State of California, In the
Matter of the Clemency Request of Francis Mary Caccavale 5 (May 27, 1993). [hereinafter
Executive Decision Caccavale].
215. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 429-40 (1993) (J. Blackmun, dissenting) (citations
omitted).
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committed this crime. The Governor, unlike the courts, is in the unique
position to consider these mitigating circumstances and is not bound by
mandatory sentencing guidelines. Caccavale's pardon fits squarely within
the tradition of pardons granted on grounds of mercy, not because she was
a battered woman per se but because the justness of the result is propor-
tionate to the gravity of the offense.
Governor Wilson's commutatuion of Brenda Aris' sentence was also
grounded in mercy. Governor Wilson's sympathy for her "pain and ter-
ror... during the many episodes of violence '216 may be a proper basis for
a grant of clemency. His willingness to take into account the brutality she
experienced at the hand of her victim involves an assessment of the justness
of applying the mandatory penalty for second degree murder-fifteen
years to life-to battering victims. The justness of Wilson's pardon there-
fore requires recognition of the special circumstances of battering cases.
To the extent that a pardon rests on such grounds, similar review of the
nature of any battering suffered should be extended on a routine basis to
all prisoners in similar circumstances.
B. Scenario IL Mandatory Considerations of Clemency and the
Demands of Justice
Clemency review should permit the governor to reach the merit of
claims that courts cannot or will not address. This class of cases involves
circumstances in which the judiciary has never ruled on the issue and can-
not now act on the claim because the issue was subject to procedural de-
fault or some other procedural restriction of habeas review21 7 Clemency
becomes extremely important in these cases where the criminal justice sys-
tem has restricted its power to remedy injustices it has imposed. In fact,
clemency review is mandatory where executive review corrects those de-
fects in the criminal justice system that would render the system itself
unjust.
Herrera combines these factors in their most compelling form. Her-
rera argued that new evidence demonstrated his innocence and that it
would be a violation of due process to execute him. The Supreme Court
held that it would not expand habeas jurisprudence to permit judicial con-
sideration of new evidence, but that the result was neither unjust nor un-
constitutional exactly because the governor could consider the new
evidence on clemency review2 18 The Court's opinion suggests that if the
pardoning power did not exist or if the executive refuised to exercise it, the
constitutionality and the justice of the existing restrictions on appellate and
habeas review would be called into question.
216. Executive Decision Aris 5.
217. See supra part Im(B).
218. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 403-09.
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Yet, this is exactly what happens under Governor Wilson's vision of
limited clemency review: claims of judicial error subject to non-
cognizability or procedural default bars go unaddressed. The case of
Brenda Aris is again illustrative. The heart of Aris' case was her claim of
self-defense, which was offered at trial, but limited because of the trial
court's procedural rulings. She raised five claims of judicial error on direct
appellate review and each was denied.
On clemency review, Governor Wilson granted a commutation but re-
fused to revisit the appellate court's judicial determinations on any of the
five claims of error. He then extended the commutation only as an act of
mercy. Wilson's review of Aris' clemency petition in no way challenged the
judicial determinations made by the court. It did not operate as a check or
safety-net on judicial error. His grant of clemency was a purely subjective
executive decision based on mercy alone. Governor Wilson's failure to ex-
ercise comprehensive clemency review was improper. The fail-safe role of
clemency review cannot be fulfilled unless the governor is willing to enter-
tain claims of judicial error denied appellate or habeas oversight.
At the trial of a battered woman raising a claim of self-defense against
a charge that she murdered her abuser, the woman's experience with her
batterer is crucial in determining whether she acted in self-defense. If evi-
dence of battering is properly considered, the battered woman can reach
the jury on the self-defense issue.219 The self-defense claim, like the factual
innocence claim presented in Herrera, is based on the notion that punish-
ment under the circumstances is unjust because the defendant has commit-
ted no crime. If, after conviction, judicial review is barred because of non-
cognizability or procedural default, the claimant cannot have the merits of
her claim heard by the habeas courts. Unaddressed judicial error on a self-
defense claim is no less compelling than an unaddressed factual innocence
claim. In either case the executive should act to secure a just outcome by
reviewing the actual merits of a claim that the courts, by law, cannot reach.
Such an executive review does not compromise judicial concerns of
finality. Comprehensive clemency review, a purely executive act, does not
threaten judicial finality; it is exercised in specific instances because judicial
219. In Aris, Battered Woman's Syndrome (BWS) was asserted as a basis for both a
"perfect" self-defense claim (meaning that the defendant had a reasonable fear of imminent
harm from the victim) and for an "imperfect" self-defense claim (meaning that the defend-
ant had an actual and honest fear, reasonableness notwithstanding, of imminent harm from
the victim). People v. Aris, 215 Cal. App. 3d 1178 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).
The Court of Appeal in Aris upheld the trial court's decision not to instruct the jury on
perfect self-defense because it found that no reasonable juror could conclude that a sleeping
abuser poses an imminent threat to his partner. Id., at 1192.
The court further held that while erroneous, it was harmless error for the trial court to
have disallowed expert testimony on how BWS affected Brenda Axis' perception of danger
because it was not "reasonably probable" that a jury could have found that Brenda honestly
could have believed that her husband posed an imminent danger to her. Id. at 1199-1201.
Governor Wilson's limited clemency review did not revisit BWS as a basis for either form of
self-defense.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Review of Law and Social Policy
[Vol. XXIV:43
HeinOnline  -- 24 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 82 1998
A RIGHTFUL CLAIM TO CLEMENCY
review is unavailable or impractical. Executive clemency places no addi-
tional burden on the courts. Nor are federalism concerns implicated be-
cause executive clemency is exercised by a state official.
Wilson's failure to revisit legal issues denied on post-conviction review
is also improper because, by refusing to revisit the legal basis of a claim like
Axis' self-defense claim, the Governor bypassed the opportunity to explore
the ultimate justification for the executive pardon: the absence of actual
guilt. A legal system that incarcerates innocent people is unjust. When
exculpatory evidence is not presented or is presented poorly by incompe-
tent defense counsel at the criminal trial, the prisoner only has one year
after she exhausts her direct appeals to fie a federal habeas petition. After
the AEDPA's one year statute of limitations expires, the criminal justice
system must rely heavily on executive review to free an innocent prisoner.
C. Scenario III: Discretionary Justice
In this final section, I analyze situations where courts may be con-
strained in their consideration of claims they can reach because of estab-
lished legal rules, the principle of stare decisis, or judicial reluctance to
revisit an issue that has already been decided. A factual or legal claim may
be denied because it fails to meet an established legal standard, the applica-
tion of which may be just in most contexts. In the exceptional case, how-
ever, the same claim can result in fundamental injustice. These cases are
squarely within the traditional exercise of the clemency power, yet neither
essential to the administration of justice, nor solely questions of mercy.
These cases, like those in the previous section, involve the ultimate justice
of the result. However, because they do not raise the same issues of institu-
tional competence, the executive should act with greater caution. Aris'
case and the cases of other battered women are again useful to illustrate
three types of representative issues.
1. Evidentiary Rules that Preclude Consideration of Relevant Testimony
f the appellate court is precluded by law from considering evidence
that is probative of the effect on jurors of trial court error, and if appellate
consideration of that evidence might have led to a different conclusion
about the integrity of the verdict, then the executive has a duty to consider
the evidence in deciding whether to grant clemency. The executive may, of
course, ultimately decide that no injustice was involved.
In Brenda Aris' clemency petition, she claimed that statements made
by jurors during post-trial interviews, had they been considered, would
have contradicted the appellate court's conclusion that the trial court's lim-
itation of expert testimony was harmless3 0 Jurors' statements that the
220. "I was the juror in the case who argued that Brenda had battered-women syn-
drome [sic]. I felt, and vocalized to the jury, that we were not allowed to be told by psychol-
ogist Lenore Walker, author of The Battered Woman, that Brenda had [battered woman's
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limitation on expert testimony had a significant impact on their verdict
could have supported a finding of harmful error, but these statements
could not be considered by the appellate court because the information was
technically unavailable.22' California Evidence Code 1150(a) limits the ad-
mission of evidence that may be considered in challenging the integrity of a
jury verdict.2 " To protect the sanctity of the jury, a judge may not replay
the deliberation process, because to do so would exceed the court's limited
authority to invade the traditionally inviolate nature of the jury proceed-
ings. Allowing an inquiry of that scope could open a Pandora's box of
challenges to all criminal convictions.
While it is reasonable and perhaps necessary that the appellate courts'
review of jury decisions be generally subject to such limitation, these re-
strictions can prevent meaningful review of the effect of trial error in cir-
cumstances such as in Aris, where evidence of the harmful effect was
known. Strict application of California Evidence Code 1150(a) prevented
the Aris appellate court from considering the statements of jurors that the
verdict would have been different had the domestic violence expert been
permitted to testify regarding her evaluation of the defendant.
In its ultimate impact, the court's inability to consider the juror state-
ments in Aris is identical to the judicial refusal to consider new evidence in
Herrera. In each case, procedural rules barred consideration of evidence
relevant to the assessment of the accuracy of the guilty verdict. Like Her-
rera, Aris was not "left without a forum;" in theory, she had the full benefit
of the age-old remedy of executive clemency. In reality though, when the
Governor refused to consider the possibility of clemency on such grounds,
there was no one left in the system to consider the compelling evidence
that the trial court error was not "harmless" in the eyes of the jury.
Axis' assertion does not necessarily mandate a conclusion that the ver-
dict in her case was wrong. The appellate court may have based its ruling
of harmless error, not on prediction of juror sentiment, but on a conclusion
that a reasonable jury, had it been able to consider the excluded expert
testimony, should still have found that Aris did not meet the self-defense
syndrome]. The juror who wanted a 2nd degree conviction, told me I was wrong and argued
we would have been told if she had. I discovered, after the trial, I was right. Judge Webster
would not allow Ms. Walker to testify on the [sic] behalf of Brenda." Petition for Commuta-
tion, supra note 1, at 15-16. The expert would have testified that Brenda Ads suffered from
"battered woman's syndrome and about how her experiences as a battered woman affected
her state of mind at the time of the killing." Aris, 215 Cal. App. 3d at 1191.
221. Aris, 215 Cal.App.3d at 1200 n.6.
222. Under the California Evidence Code § 1150(a), evidence is limited to statements,
conduct, conditions, or events open to sight, hearing, and the other senses that are likely to
influence the verdict improperly. "No evidence is admissible to show the effect of such
statement, conduct, condition or event upon a juror either in influencing him to assent to or
dissent from the verdict." CAL. EVID. CODE § 1150(a) (West 1995).
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requirement that the harm she feared was "imminent." The juror state-
ments could be read to mean that Aris might have been unjustifiably ac-
quitted but for the trial court error. Consideration of the evidence of the
juror statements, even were it interpreted in the light most favorable to
Axis, does not inescapably lead to the conclusion that the verdict was
wrong or her sentence unjust. The role of clemency in this context must
involve determination of the larger question of whether the particular his-
tory of the case suggests an unjust result. In the context of that aspect of
the clemency review, the jurors' statements should be considered together
with the underlying issues of battered women's self-defense claims which
are discussed below.
2. Changing Mores, Understanding, and Information
The determination of a just result varies not only with the evidence
available to the trier of fact, but with the conceptual understanding of the
nature of the offense and available defenses. When an English judge found
four-year-old Katherine Passeavant guilty of murder, he did so in the con-
text of a judicial system that did not yet recognize an infancy defense, and
in a society that had yet to draw a legal distinction between the responsibil-
ities of a child and an adult. In similar fashion, the defense claims of a
battered woman require recognition of patterns of behavior and distinctive
psychology that until recent years were largely unknown. The earliest
study showing that a woman's perception may be influenced by the bat-
tering experience was published in 1979V4 It was this study that laid the
groundwork for the development of expert testimony.
In California, it was another ten years before the appellate court pub-
lished People v. Aris.- s Two years after Aris, the California legislature,
with the support of Governor Wilson, adopted California Evidence Code
§ 1107, a section which specifically supports the propriety of admitting such
testimony.216 Of the thirty women represented by the California Coalition
for Battered Women in Prison who petitioned Governor Wilson for clem-
ency, twenty never had the benefit of expert testimony regarding what ef-
fect their experiences may have had on their perceptions at the time of the
killing.? 7 In those cases, there is no arguable claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel because, at the time the cases were tried, there was no psycho-
logical data supporting such a claim.
223. Harmful error found on appellate review results in reversal of conviction. A re-
versal is considered an order to a new trial unless the opinion states otherwise. See, eg.,
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1262 (West 1995).
224. LroRE E. WALKER, THE BATrERED WomAN 61 (1979).
225. Aris, 215 Cal.App.3d 1178.
226. CAL EVr. CODE § 1107 (West 1995). The California legislature initially approved
of the admissibility of expert witness testimony regarding battered woman's syndrome in
1991. Id.
227. Statistical information regarding petitions filed by CCBWP are on file with the
author.
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A battered woman whose case was tried before the psychological dy-
namics of battering relationships were understood is in the same position as
a four-year-old in a judicial system that does not recognize an infancy de-
fense. Neither the court nor the jury could consider what effect her bat-
tering experience may have had on her perception of danger. Moreover, to
the extent that the system later recognized the relevance of a battered wo-
man's experience, procedural rules bar courts from later consideration of
the relevance of this evidence to her self-defense claim. 228 The only hope
the criminal justice system holds out for this woman is executive clemency.
In Aris' case, the juror statements are compelling. Domestic violence
and the effect it has on victims' experiences and perceptions are now better
understood. To the extent that jurors in her case interpreted the trial
court's limitation of expert testimony as a conclusion that Brenda was not a
battered woman, they erred in a way that reflects not only their misunder-
standing about the court's ruling, but unfamiliarity with the relatively new
psychological dynamics of domestic violence. Although the appellate court
did consider whether Aris was entitled to invoke self-defense in its conclu-
sion that the trial court error was harmless, the Governor could have con-
cluded that the combination of appellate court insensitivity and juror
confusion was also a product of limited familiarity with battered women
and their experiences.
Clemency based on considerations of evolving understanding does not
necessarily raise the same institutional issues as Herrera because the judici-
ary in Aris was not barred from consideration of the issues. Nonetheless,
to the extent that the executive concludes that a sentence is unjust and that
the injustice resulted from changing standards or judicial confusion, clem-
ency review is an appropriate response. Furthermore, if implementation of
changing standards does result in radically inconsistent or arbitrary results,
the issues might raise the types of institutional concerns that make clem-
ency review mandatory.
3. Executive, Legislative and Judicial Disagreement
a. The Governor v. The Courts
Application of the pardoning power is not limited to purposes of
mercy or to cases in which the appellate courts were otherwise constrained
from reaching a just result. If an executive finds that the application of an
established legal standard is inconsistent with principles of justice, the exec-
utive may exercise the pardoning power to correct the injustice. The exec-
utive may thus disagree with a judicial conclusion in an individual case and
act on that difference, if the executive believes the result in the case was
wrong.
228. See supra part III(C).
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In some cases, very harsh results flow from judicial reluctance to ex-
pand existing legal standards. While it recognized that other jurisdictions
have permitted expert testimony to address the ultimate question of a par-
ticular defendant's reasonableness in the exercise of defensive force, the
court in People v. Aris refused to go that far itself.19 Governor Wilson,
however, had the power to disagree with the Aris court's judgment and to
override it in that case. He could conclude, as have courts in other jurisdic-
tions s0 that expert testimony explaining the impact of a history of abuse
can assist a jury's determination of the reasonableness of an abused wo-
man's actions?3' If the Governor disagrees with the Court of Appeal and
concludes that Aris' actions were not criminal-or not criminal at the level
of her affirmed conviction -he would be acting rightly within the scope of
his power to grant clemency.
Such an act is improperly characterized as an act of executive con-
science and a usurpation of the judicial process. The executive pardon is
always an interference with judicial prerogative, and Governor Wilson's
pardons of Ais and Caccavale are not exceptions. Though Wilson granted
the pardons for the narrow reason that he took pity on the women, he
overturned years of appellate decisions in granting them. Such an act is
proper and is in keeping with the traditional purpose of clemency to correct
injustice which was not remedied by the judicial process.
The executive is an extra-judicial actor who is not constrained by the
evidentiary and procedural rules regulating the courts. While the executive
may defer to the judicial system, he is not obliged to do so. Governor Wil-
son's liberal discretion under the pardoning power made him the only actor
in a position to evaluate the juror statements in Aris. Clearly, his duty to
229. One of the key holdings of the Court of Appeal in Aris was its decision to uphold
the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury on reasonable or "perfect" self-defense. The
court found that there was not "substantial evidence" to support the defense and that no
such instruction was required. The basis for this decision was the court's assumption that no
"jury composed of reasonable men could have concluded that" a sleeping victim presents an
imminent danger of great bodily harm." Aris, 215 Cal. App. 3d at 1192 (quoting People v.
Flannel, 25 Cal. 3d 668, 684 (Cal. 1979)). In other words, the court concluded that it was
factually impossible to satisfy the reasonableness requirement of perfect self-defense. Con-
sistent with that conclusion, the court held that expert testimony on the reasonableness of
Aris' conduct, the linchpin of "perfect" self-defense, was irrelevant. The court reasoned
that Aris' subjective state of mind was not relevant to the reasonableness of her actions.
Aris, 215 Cal. App. 3d at 1196-98.
230. See Aris, 215 Cal. App. 3d at 1198 n.5 (citing State v. Norman, 324 S.E. 2d 8,11-12
(N.C. 1989) (finding defendant guilty of voluntary manslaughter based, in part, on testi-
mony that defendant had BWS and it appeared "reasonably necessary" to her to kill her
husband); State v. Stewart, 763 P.2d 572, 579 (Kan. 1988) ("BWS relevant to a determina-
tion of the reasonableness of the defendant's perception of danger"); State v. Lcidholm, 334
N.W.2d 811 (N.D. 1983) (holding "BWS" testimony relevant to reasonableness of percep-
tion of imminent danger).
231. A defendant's prior experience with the victim of a homicide is admissible in any
criminal case when a claim of self-defense is raised. See, e.g., In re Christian S., 13 Cal. Rptr.
2d 232 (Cal. 1992).
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review the case does not carry a corresponding obligation to grant clem-
ency. The pardoning power simply provides the opportunity to affect the
outcome of a case if, after the review required by the constitution, the Gov-
ernor concludes that the conviction was unjust. In Aris, Governor Wilson
had the power to consider critical information which the Court of Appeal
could not. The jurors' statements, at a minimum, undercut certainty that
the trial court error was harmless. They demonstrated that, had the erro-
neously excluded expert testimony been admitted, at least two jurors would
have concluded that Aris' fear was informed by her status as a battered
woman who honestly feared her abuser. This would have been sufficient to
find imperfect self-defense (on which jury instructions were given) and pre-
clude a conviction of murder in the second degree.3 2 The highest verdict
likely would have been manslaughter.
b. The Governor v. The Legislature
A more profound separation of powers issue is raised by the question
of whether the executive has the power to substitute his or her own judg-
ment for that of the legislature. Does the constitution permit the Governor
to grant clemency to all battered women tried without the benefit of expert
testimony, regardless of the underlying circumstances? Could he take such
action even where the legislature has already determined that such evi-
dence is inadmissible? If the governor were personally opposed to the
death penalty, could he simply refuse to execute all prisoners on that basis
alone?
The short answer to all of these questions is "yes." There are no for-
mal limitations on the pardoning power. The executive power to pardon
plays an institutional role in determining policy as well as in dispensing
justice and mercy.z3 The answer however, is not uncomplicated in its im-
plications. Executive exercise of the pardoning power is most controversial
where it directly contradicts legislative decision-making. The executive's
power to grant clemency on such a basis should be exercised with caution,
with the recognition that he is substituting his own preferences for those of
the legislature on broad issues of public policy. While the constitutional
provisions providing for clemency permit such a result,234 the executive act
can be equivalent to a veto or executive nullification. To the extent the
232. Governor Wilson's failure to reconsider the harmless error issue in Aris is particu-
larly troubling given the fact that federal habeas courts use a less demanding harmless error
standard than the "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt" standard used on direct review.
See supra text accompanying notes 191-92. Habeas corpus, therefore, is hardly a safety-net
for petitioners on harmless error issues.
233. A pardon granted to all war resistors or rebels engaged in an insurrection is an
example of policy-setting pardoning not only permitted, but endorsed by the founding fa-
thers. See supra Part I(B)(1).
234. See supra Parts III(B) and (C).
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Governor acts on policy grounds, he should be especially prepared to de-
fend the decision in the political arena.
CONCLUSION
Pardons are too often mischaracterized as acts of mere personal or
political opinion. The reality is that the power to pardon serves a critical,
constitutionally-required role within the criminal justice system. A re-
stricted definition of the pardoning power exacerbates public misconcep-
tions and undermines the integrity of this important constitutional
allocation of power to the executive branch. In Brenda Aris' case, Gover-
nor Wilson's decision emphasized that clemency was extended as an act of
mercy, an act properly within his discretion235 Pardons based on mercy
may also be just. However, Governor Wilson's statement that mercy and
factual innocence are the only justifications for which a pardon may be
granted devalued the pardoning power and perpetuated public confusion
about its constitutional purpose.
The Governor characterized his refusal to revisit legal issues as defer-
ence to the judicial process. He was wrong. His refusal is, in fact, a refuta-
tion of a system of criminal justice in which judicial actions are the major,
but not the only, part. Although his stance may well be motivated by an
understandable fear of political repercussion, such a concern does not jus-
tify his failure to fulfill a responsibility of his office. Public understanding
of the true nature and role of the pardoning power should be promoted by
governors who wish to insulate the executive office from the political fall-
out that has often surrounded the misunderstood exercise of that power.
By granting clemency to 78-year-old Frances Caccavale, reducing by
three years the fifteen-to-life sentence of Brenda Aris, and posthumously
pardoning Jack Ryan, Governor Wilson acknowledged that mercy and in-
nocence were proper grounds for the exercise of clemency. These were
narrowly defined -and almost risk-free from a political standpoint -acts
of clemency. Ironically, while a grant of clemency to address an appellate
failure may appear more politically dangerous, this use of the pardoning
power has a more compelling justification than a discretionary act of
mercy. In Aris' case, the Governor should have recognized and explained
that, while the Court of Appeal acted properly in applying the harmless
error standard, he was nonetheless compelled to reach an independent de-
termination on the basis of information the court could not consider. Par-
dons under these circumstances, as when doors to habeas corpus relief are
closed to prisoners, should be the subject of informed public discussion that
can protect an executive from political backlash. As Justice Rehnquist
made clear in the majority opinion in Herrera, the Governor is the only
person in the position to rectify wrongs in these contexts.
235. Petition for Commutation, supra note 1, at 25-28.
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Even a well-founded concern for his or her own political future does
not justify narrowing an executive's role in the pardoning process. Gover-
nor Wilson's total refusal to consider the legal issues presented by Aris'
petition was rooted in an incorrect view of his obligations. When clemency
review is limited to considerations of mercy, the public image of a pardon
as an arbitrary executive act, unrelated to justice, is reinforced. This is par-
ticularly disturbing when it marginalizes the petitioner's innocence. Wilson
granted a commutation to Aris only because he took pity on her, without
regard to the question of whether she was wrongly convicted. If her con-
viction was wrong, Aris owes no debt to society. Her continued incarcera-
tion and separation from her children and the severe social stigma of a
murder conviction are a continuing injustice. This distinction has been dis-
avowed by Governor Wilson's restricted definition of the pardoning power.
Wilson's position is without constitutional or moral basis.
The Governor's duty to serve the ends of justice does not change
based on the source of the injustice. The fact that a question has already
been litigated does not make rectifying an injustice any less compelling.
Trial error unremedied by appellate court review is perhaps most worthy of
executive redress. Clemency in such situations responds to a institutional
failure -it functions as a procedural safety-net.
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